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Abstract
In a population of altruists, all individuals thrive. But altruists are exploited by
cheating individuals which do not perform altruistic acts but still beneﬁt from those.
In these conditions cooperation cannot easily evolve. This issue is resolved by kin
recognition: altruists recognise each other through the use of a conspicuous tag.
These altruists do well until cheaters acquire the signalling tag and disrupt the
cooperation. But altruists using a diﬀerent tag can then invade the population,
followed by new cheaters. This mechanism can lead to a diversity of tags coexisting
in the population. However it has not yet been applied in realistic biological systems.
In this thesis, I formulated mathematical and simulation models to investigate the
eﬀect of diversity on the evolutionary dynamics in systems where diﬀerent altru-
ists compete with cheaters. In particular, I focused on organisms producing public
goods, i.e. goods that can proﬁt to the whole population. I considered two biolo-
gical systems models: gynodioecious populations of plants, where hermaphrodites
produce pollen that can be used by female-only individuals, and bacteria produ-
cing an iron-chelating molecule, called siderophore, that can be exploited by both
producers and non-producers.
I found that diversity in gynodioecious plants is dependent on population structure.
In particular, I found that the maximal level of diversity occurs when the population
structure does not favour altruists or cheaters. Next, I found a number of import-
ant results in siderophore-producing bacteria. By considering a detailed ecological
model, I derived Hamilton's rule in a metapopulation and found that the level of
cooperation in a population depends on the length of interaction between strains.
Finally, I discovered a novel evolutionary mechanism generating and maintaining
diversity and showed that it results from non-equilibrium mechanisms. These ﬁnd-
ings explain why cheaters appear readily in experiments but are rare in natural
populations.
My results demonstrate the importance of integrating ecological details in order to
understand the mechanisms leading to cooperation and diversity, and will provide
a basis and framework for future studies on the emergence and maintenance of
diversity.
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Thesis overview
Understanding the mechanisms underlying the evolution of biodiversity is one of the
major challenges in evolutionary biology. It has been shown that social interactions
can drive the evolution of diversity. For instance, the idea of chromodynamics (or
tag-based cooperation) is that individuals can recognise each other through the use
of a conspicuous tag. Altruists using a secret signal thrive, until a cheater acquires
the signal through mutations, and destroy the cooperation based on this signal.
However new altruists using another signal, unusable by the resident cheaters, can
re-establish cooperation in the population, before another cheater acquires the new
tag.
In this thesis, I used mathematical and simulation models in order to explore the
potential for the emergence and maintenance of diversity in systems of cooperat-
ors/cheaters. In particular, I focused on organisms producing public goods, i.e.
goods from which all individuals in the population beneﬁt. I considered two biolo-
gical systems models: gynodioecious populations of plants, where hermaphrodites
produce pollen that can be used by female-only individuals, and bacteria producing
an iron chelating molecule, named siderophore, which can be exploited by producers
and non-producers.
I found a number of important results. In Chapter 2, by developing a model simulat-
ing gynodioecious plants dynamics I found that diversity is dependent on population
structure. In particular, I determined that a maximal level of diversity can occur for
intermediate values of viscosity. The dynamics produced by the model are concur-
ring with ﬁeld observations, showing a high polymorphism, associated with spatial
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structure. Next, I developed in Chapter 3 a model of siderophore-producing bac-
teria competing in a metapopulation, and where the siderophore production level
evolves. I found that in this setting, the level of siderophore production reach an
evolutionary single strategy, which is determined by the interplay between altruists
and cheaters. Importantly, I also derived Hamilton's rule from ecological principles.
How diversity has arisen in siderophore-producing bacteria is not well known. In
Chapter 4 I explored the hypothesis that siderophore diversity arises as a defence
mechanism preventing the exploitation of producers by non-producing strains. By
formulating and analysing a mathematical model of siderophore-producing bacteria
where diﬀerent siderophore types can appear, I showed that in fact siderophore
cheaters work as an evolutionary force promoting diversity by counteracting genetic
drift. The resulting dynamics is unstable because of the stochastic processes that
take place. In Chapter 5, I derived conditions for the local stability of the equilibrium
in this model. I found that the stability depends on the level of diversity and on the
mutation rates.
My results demonstrate how diversity can arise and be maintained in two biologically
realistic examples. Moreover, I showed that diversity results from non-equilibrium
mechanisms. I argue that this has relevance in many other biological systems, such
as budding yeasts or side-blotched lizards, and can help developing new theoret-
ical frameworks and experimental protocols for the evolution of cooperation and
diversity.
15
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Evolution of cooperation
How does evolution work? In 1859 in the Origin of species, Darwin proposed a
theory that we now know as natural selection. He noted that evolution selects on
biological traits found within a population arguing that, if a speciﬁc trait will allow
its bearer to have more oﬀspring, this trait will spread in the population. On the
contrary, if the trait is detrimental, it will disappear. This theory led to the term
survival of the ﬁttest (Spencer, 1864).
According to this theory, an individual should always seek to maximise its number of
oﬀspring: selﬁsh behaviour should dominate. The evolution of altruism thus poses
a Darwinian paradox. In a population of cooperators, all individuals would thrive.
However, a selﬁsh individual could exploit the act of cooperation of others without
putting any eﬀort in itself. We can assume that it would produce more oﬀspring
than the cooperators, and consequently the frequency of the selﬁsh (cheating) indi-
viduals will increase in future generations. On the face of it, natural selection would
eventually lead to the disappearance of the cooperators from the population.
Given this paradox, one would expect cooperation to be rare or not exist at all. But
examples of cooperating behaviour are numerous in Nature, ranging from production
16
of chemical compounds beneﬁcial to all individuals in bacteria, to colony defence
in mammals (Wilson, 1975, Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). There should thus exist
mechanisms that will generate such cooperation which are consistent with the tenets
of Darwin's theory.
In this thesis, I will focus on those scenarios where cooperative behaviour involves
the production of public goods. Here I will use the deﬁnition of public good
commonly used in the ﬁeld of evolutionary biology: that is something which can
be exploited by all individuals in the population (Rankin et al., 2007). Examples
of public goods are the production of iron scavenging molecules (siderophores) or
toxins, by bacteria.
A famous example of cooperation on a public good is Hardin's tragedy of the com-
mons (Hardin, 1968), which provides an insightful illustration on the issue of cooper-
ation versus cheating, when exploiting a common resource. The original tragedy of
the commons applies to a group of cattle farmers exploiting a common pasture. This
pasture constitutes a public good because it is shared by all the farmers. Here we
suppose that each farmer intends to maximize their proﬁt derived from using the
pasture. Given this, any particular farmer would put as many cows on the pasture
as possible. Unfortunately, this will eventually lead to the overexploitation of the
pasture and its tragic destruction.
Analogous to the tragedy of the commons there are also situations where the mem-
bers of the population generate the shared resource themselves. In these cases, there
is an incentive to contribute less, and this is often referred to as the temptation
to cheat (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981, Axelrod, 1984, Bronstein, 2001, van Baalen
and Jansen, 2003). As with the tragedy of the commons, the cost of these lower
contributions is shared by the whole population.
17
1.1.1 Modelling evolution
There are two approaches when doing scientiﬁc research. Either we try to understand
Nature by observation and experimentation, or we use simpliﬁed representations
(modelling). This thesis falls in the second category. Rather than presenting all the
concepts classically used to study evolution, for example (Fisher, 1930, Haldane,
1932, Maynard Smith, 1982, Hamilton, 1996), I focus here on the concepts and
techniques used in the present thesis.
Evolutionary game theory
As Darwin pointed out in his Origin of species, the aim for any individual is to
maximise its ﬁtness. In order to understand how a trait evolves in a population,
Maynard Smith and Price (1973) applied the concepts of game theory to evolutionary
biology to form what we now know as evolutionary game theory (EGT). In EGT,
individuals in a population are characterised by a heritable strategy, and the aim is
to study how good this strategy is depending on the frequencies of other strategies
in the population. A better strategy leads to a higher ﬁtness, which translate to a
more frequent representation of this strategy in the population in future generations.
A key concept is that ﬁtness is not an absolute measure, but is relative to other
individuals' ﬁtnesses: the success of a strategy is not solely determined by itself, but
is context-speciﬁc, meaning that it depends on the other strategies present in the
population. I will here present the classical example of EGT, called the Prisoner's
dilemma.
The prisoner's dilemma is the most famous evolutionary game and the most studied.
It this scenario, two thieves have been caught by the police and are held in two
separate cells. The head of the police proposes to each of them the following deal: If
they both stay silent (cooperation), they will both serve only one month for minor
charges. If one stays silent and the other denounces him (defection or cheating), then
18
the ﬁrst will serve one year and the second will walk out free. Finally, if they both
denounce each other, they will both serve six months (Idea formulated by Tucker in
1950).
What should they do? The dilemma here is that the best strategy all round would
be for both to cooperate, but each prisoner will be better oﬀ denouncing the other,
irrespective of the other's decision. Thus, both prisoners defecting is the expected
outcome of the game. The tragedy of the commons game is similar to the prisoner's
dilemma, except that the game is played with many individuals instead of two. In
both scenarios, the best strategy for an individual is the selﬁsh one.
Adaptive dynamics
Evolutionary game theory is interesting but it lacks biological realism, and it does
not take population dynamics into account. To overcome this issue, other techniques
have been developed, in particular adaptive dynamics, which combine evolutionary
game theory with population dynamics. I will here present a brief summary of
adaptive dynamics (for a detailed review, see Geritz et al., 1998). The main idea of
adaptive dynamics is to study the evolution of a phenotypic trait in a population
of haploid individuals, through the analysis of diﬀerential equations. To do so, it
makes a crucial assumption, which is a time scale separation between ecology and
evolution. Indeed, it is considered that evolution is a mutation-limited process, so
that a population is at an ecological attractor (equilibrium) before a mutation event.
If the new trait arising by mutation is beneﬁcial for its bearer, then it will grow in
the population and replace the former trait eventually becoming the new resident
trait.
Consider a monomorphic population of resident A, with a quantitative trait a (such
as size). Its dynamics is represented by the following diﬀerential equation
dA
dt
= r(a,EA)A
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where r(a,EA) is the per capita growth rate of A, determined by ecological principles
and EA is the environment of A. At the ecological equilibrium, this per capita growth
rate is zero. Consider now a mutant A′ with a slightly diﬀerent trait a′. Similarly,
its dynamics is given by
dA′
dt
= r(a′, EA)A′
where r(a′, EA) is the per capita growth rate of A′ in the environment of A (because
A′ is very rare). This growth rate is equivalent to the invasion ﬁtness, dubbed sa(a′).
If the invasion ﬁtness is positive, the mutant invades, and if it is negative the mutant
disappears.
In adaptive dynamics, mutations are assumed to be small, so that the mutated trait
drifts only a little from the resident trait. To determine the direction of evolution,
we consider that the mutated trait is almost identical. Thus it suﬃces to calculate
the sign of the gradient of selection which is the derivative of the ﬁtness function
∂s
∂a′
∣∣∣∣
a′=a
However, for some values of a, that we can call a∗, this selection gradient can become
0, i.e. when
∂s
∂a′
∣∣∣∣
a′=a=a∗
= 0
These points are known as evolutionary singularities, and represent either a max-
imum or a minimum of the ﬁtness function s. On the one hand if it is a maximum,
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this means that the a∗ trait cannot be invaded by nearby mutants: it is an evolu-
tionary stable strategy (ESS). On the other hand if it is a minimum, this means that
the a∗ trait is invadable by any nearby mutant: the population will be subject to
disruptive selection, eventually leading to an evolutionary branching. To determine
whether the evolutionary singularity is an ESS or a branching point, it suﬃces to
determine the sign of the second derivative of the ﬁtness function at the singularity.
The criterion for an ESS is
∂2s
∂a′2
∣∣∣∣
a′=a=a∗
< 0
The reverse condition logically leads to a branching point. The evolutionary dy-
namics can be represented graphically using a Pairwise Invasibility Plot (PIP). A
PIP is a diagram showing the sign of the ﬁtness on the (a, a′) domain (Figure 1.1)
1.1.2 How can cooperation arise ?
I have earlier stated that cooperation needs enabling mechanisms to arise. I will here
focus on the eﬀect of spatial structuring. In the area of ecological and evolutionary
dynamics, two families of models exist: non-spatial, and viscous models. In non-
spatial models (or well-mixed population models), it is assumed that all individuals
in the population interact with each other with equal probability. As a consequence,
the beneﬁts of cooperating are shared between all individuals, cooperators or cheat-
ers, and thus cooperation cannot persist.
The second family includes viscous models. The term viscous was ﬁrst used by
Hamilton (1964). In these models, the interactions between individuals are not
random. For instance, individuals either interact only with their nearby neighbours
or the probability of interacting with another individual decreases with the distance
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(a) ESS (b) Branching point
Figure 1.1: Illustration of the adaptive dynamics. The + regions are areas where a
mutant trait can invade the resident trait, and the - regions areas where a mutant
trait cannot. (a) Evolutionary stable strategy. (b) Branching point. The PIPs can be
read as follows: starting at any point on the diagonal, giving the value of the resident
trait, a mutation can occur. If the mutant trait is in the + regions, the mutant
invades and replaces the resident, and becomes the new resident. This eventually
leads to the evolutionary singularity (point where the ﬁtness function crosses the
diagonal), corresponding to a maximum (ESS) or a minimum (Branching point). If
it is a ESS, it cannot be invaded by any nearby mutant, and the ESS is the endpoint
of evolution. If it is a branching point, it can be invaded by any nearby mutant and
the population experiences disruptive selection.
between them. If we consider that a given individual carries an altruistic gene, the
limited dispersal of its oﬀspring will mean the formation of a cluster of individuals
with the same gene. Thus, an altruist individual is more likely to interact with
another individual carrying the same altruistic gene than it would when it interacts
with a random individual in the population.
Thus, even if the act of cooperation does not directly beneﬁt the actor, there is an
indirect beneﬁt through the increase of ﬁtness for the recipient, which is likely to
be a relative (kin). This is the basis of kin selection or inclusive ﬁtness theory
(Hamilton, 1964, Maynard Smith, 1964). Hamilton's verbal argument has also been
accompanied by an inequality, which we now know as Hamilton's rule:
RB > C
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where B is the beneﬁt and C the cost of performing the altruistic act. Hamilton's
rule explains how altruism can evolve if the beneﬁts gained by receiving an altruistic
act, modulated by the relatedness between actor and recipient, outweigh the cost
of performing the altruistic act. In simple terms, altruism can evolve if the bene-
ﬁts go towards related individuals, which will indirectly transmit the gene of the
cooperating actor and spatial structure is a way of ensuring that the beneﬁts are so
directed. The R parameter is called relatedness and has received many interpreta-
tions. A commonly accepted deﬁnition is that it is the probability for an individual
of encountering another individual which carries the same gene in its local group,
relative to the probability of encountering one in the global population (Queller and
Goodnight, 1989). Thus relatedness should be higher in populations exhibiting lim-
ited dispersal, and a high relatedness should favour the emergence/maintenance of
cooperative behaviour (Hamilton, 1964).
1.1.3 Examples of spatial structure
In this thesis, I will present a model of the dynamics of gynodioecious plants on
a square lattice in Chapter 2. The motivation behind choosing a squared lattice
(instead of a random) is for biological realism. Typically, I consider that the spatial
structure resembles an agricultural ﬁeld, where every plants are ﬁxed on a particular
plot, and are evenly spaced with the other plants. The model is a cellular automaton
consisting of a grid, where all cells exhibit a given state (determined by the ecology),
such as alive or dead (Figure 1.2). Each cell experiences a neighbourhood, which
deﬁnes the cells it can interact with. The state of each cell is then updated through
updating rules determined by the ecological dynamics. Note that on ﬁgure 1.2a, the
cellular automaton resembles an agricultural ﬁeld, but in fact the boundaries are
interconnected: the east end joins the west end, and the north end joins the south,
so that the actual shape is a torus.
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In chapter 3,4 and 5, I will model siderophore evolution in a metapopulation. In-
deed, in experimental studies of siderophore evolution, the set-up is made such that
bacteria interacts both within wells (local competition) and between wells (global
competition). I chose to follow theoretically these set-ups, hence the use of metapop-
ulation models. A metapopulation consists of a set of spatially separated populations
(or patches), which interact with each other (Figure 1.2b). Each population behaves
independently of the others apart from migration between the populations. In the
model, these migration events perturb the equilibrium of the populations.
A metapopulation is an example of extreme spatial structuring: individuals in a
patch are assumed to interact almost exclusively with individuals of the same patch.
This interaction within a patch constitutes the local dynamics. The global dynamics
are often at a diﬀerent time scale and are deﬁned by migration and mixing between
patches. Depending on the model's assumptions, patches can have internal structure
as well (or not). I will present a modelling of the dynamics of siderophore producing
bacteria in a metapopulation in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. I consider that each patch is
well mixed, so that the spatial structure is given only through the metapopulation
set-up.
1.2 How diversity can arise from social interactions
The classical models of cooperation are constrained on the interaction between al-
truists and cheaters. Recent developments have shown a richer image of social
interactions, which are not limited to one altruist versus one cheater. A famous ex-
ample is the rock-paper-scissors game. This children's game is simple: rock crushes
scissors, scissors cut paper, and paper covers rock. When the game is played with
pure strategies (which is the case in biological organisms), the resulting dynamics
are unstable (May and Leonard, 1975), because no strategies dominate the other
two. Thus, we observe cycles of invasion of the diﬀerent strategies, which are always
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(a) Squared lattice (b) Metapopulation
Figure 1.2: Examples of spatial structures.
bested by another one. Kerr et al. (2002) found that diversity of strategies is main-
tained when the competition is local but that it is lost when competition is global. I
will also discuss the eﬀect of the scale of competition on diversity in Chapter 2. The
rock-paper-scissors game has recently been discovered to be played in a population
of lizards (side-blotched lizards), which indeed exhibit alternate cycles of dominance
(see Sinervo et al., 2006 for more details).
In this thesis, I focus on another type of diversity, known as chromodynamics (Jansen
and van Baalen, 2006). This follows from the green beard eﬀect (Dawkins, 1976,
Gardner and West, 2010) which assumes that organisms interact via the recognition
of a conspicuous tag (coded by a single gene, the so-called green beard gene). Such
a tag, used as a marker to discriminate carriers and non carriers of the correct allele,
would serve to favour any individuals exhibiting the same tag. By interacting pref-
erentially with each other, the green beard gene could thus increase in frequency in
the population and cooperation can arise. However, if a non-cooperating individual
(cheater) acquires the tag (by mutation for instance), it would succeed in reaping the
beneﬁts of cooperation without paying any cost and cooperation would break down.
With chromodynamics, new tags can also be generated through mutations, resulting
in a diversity of distinct sub populations of altruists and cheaters coexisting in the
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population.
The principle is simple: consider a subpopulation of altruists called At exhibiting a
tag t. Initially, this subpopulation does well, until cheaters also acquire the tag t (we
will call the cheaters Ct). These cheaters oust the altruists, but a mutant altruist Av,
using a new tag v, unrecognisable by cheaters Ct, could arise and in turn invade the
population, before being itself invaded by a cheater Cv. These cycles of invasions can
continue indeﬁnitely (Figure 1.3). Depending on the model's assumptions, dynamics
can either exhibit successive invasions of one population, so that at any time, only
one type of individual is present in the population (see Traulsen and Nowak, 2007),
or a diversity of diﬀerent altruists and cheaters coexisting simultaneously (see Jansen
and van Baalen, 2006).
Figure 1.3: The green beard eﬀect. A cooperator type blue (happy blue face)
is invaded by a cheater type blue (sad blue face), which is in turn invaded by a
cooperator type green, which is in turn invaded by a cheater type green. In this
example only two colours are present, so that a cooperator type blue can invade
the cheater type green, but the same mechanisms apply for greater number of
beards.
Greenbeards have long remained a theoretical toy. Because of their supposed com-
plexity, it has been speculated that greenbeards would be very rare in Nature
(Hamilton, 1964, Dawkins, 1976). Indeed, the original idea was that a green beard
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gene should confer both the conspicuous signal, and the altruistic behaviour, which
seems rather unlikely (but such green beard genes have been discovered, see, e.g.,
Smukalla et al., 2008). However, if two genes, one coding for the conspicuous signal,
and the other coding for the altruistic behaviour, are closely linked, they can act
similarly as a green beard gene (this example is studied in Jansen and van Baalen,
2006).
In this thesis I investigate the dynamics of cooperation and diversity in populations
where individuals cooperate via the production of a public good. If the public good is
not utilizable by the whole population but only accessible to some individuals which
can recognise it, I consider that it is in fact a restricted public good. Examples of
these restricted public goods, similarly to the GB eﬀect, are few. In the next section
I present two biological systems using these. Other examples are the FLO1 gene
causing ﬂocculation in saccharomyces cerevisiae (Smukalla et al., 2008) and the csA
gene causing adhesion in Dictyostelium discoideum (Queller et al., 2003), but studies
on their diversity are lacking.
1.3 Restricted public good systems
1.3.1 Gynodioecious plants
In gynodioecious plants, two types of individuals coexist in the population: herm-
aphrodites, which produce both pollen and seeds, and female-only individuals, which
do not produce pollen (Delanney, 1979). The female's reproduction mode is pseudo-
gamy (or gynogenesis): it is an incomplete asexual form of reproduction. Pseudo-
gamy resembles parthenogenesis because the egg develops with only maternal genetic
material, but it is incomplete because the development must be triggered by pollen
(or sperm)(Beukeboom and Vrijenhoek, 1998). Pseudogamy occurs in a wide range
of organisms, from animals to plants (Richards, 2003, Schlupp, 2005).
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Pseudogamy has often been referred to as sperm parasitism or sperm-dependent
parthenogenesis (Hubbs, 1964, Vrijenhoek, 1994), because females survive by ex-
ploiting the hermaphrodites' pollen, similarly to a parasite-host situation. However,
assuming that the production of pollen is costly for the hermaphrodites, this biolo-
gical system can also be interpreted as a public good-producing system, the public
good being the pollen, which altruists (hermaphrodites) produce and which is hi-
jacked by the cheaters (female-only plants) that do not produce any.
Moreover, there is evidence that pollen incompatibility mechanisms have evolved:
not every type of pollen is utilizable by all plants in the population (Goswami and
Matﬁeld, 1974). This indicates that the pollen might be tagged.
This biological system is thus an example of the struggle between altruists and
cheaters. Females do not produce pollen, so they can produce more seeds than
the hermaphrodites and should thus dominate the population. Moreover in this
example the tragedy of the commons is emphasized because the females need pollen
for reproduction. Without pollen they cannot produce any seeds. In simple, non-
spatial models, coexistence is not possible because females oust the hermaphrodites
of the population and die out due to the scarcity of pollen. By introducing spatial
structure (viscosity) in a cellular automaton, more recent models have showed that
the coexistence is possible (Wilson, 2000, Stewart-Cox et al., 2005, Preece and Mao,
2010). The argument is that pollen and seed do not disperse anywhere; instead they
should disperse close to the plants which produced them.
These theoretical studies investigated the possibility of coexistence between herm-
aphrodites and females, but did not take into account the incompatibility between
diﬀerent pollen types. In Chapter 2 I explore the consequences of adding a pollen
incompatibility system in a population of gynodioecious plants. I use both kin se-
lection and tag-based cooperation theory to investigate the consequences of limited
dispersal on cooperation and diversity.
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1.3.2 Siderophore-producing bacteria
Like many organisms, bacteria need iron for survival and growth. However, iron
is a scarce resource for host-dwelling bacteria because it is encapsulated in larger
molecules, such as blood proteins in mammals. To scavenge for iron in these hos-
tile environments, bacteria have developed sophisticated mechanisms. In particular,
some bacteria can produce molecules that have a very high aﬃnity for iron, called
siderophores (Guerinot, 1994). These siderophores are very diverse (Ratledge and
Dover, 2000, Wandersman and Delepelaire, 2004) but have the same structure: a
functional unit that ligates with iron molecules (transferrins, lactoferrins) and a
peptide backbone interacting with a receptor on the surface membrane of the bac-
teria. This peptide diﬀers from strain to strain, and the receptor is speciﬁc, only
recognising the corresponding peptide backbone (Hohnadel and Meyer, 1988, Cor-
nelis et al., 1989, Spencer et al., 2003, de Chial et al., 2003). The siderophores
are secreted and sent into the extracellular environment, where they can bind with
iron. Once bound, they can be taken up by any bacteria possessing a corresponding
receptor. Because the production of these siderophores is costly, they constitute
a public good, that can be hijacked by non-producing bacteria. Moreover, their
speciﬁcity means that they are restricted to a certain portion of the population.
Thus the siderophore-producing bacteria are also an adequate example of tag-based
cooperation.
The most famous and studied example of cooperation via the use of siderophores
occurs in the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa. P. aeruginosa produces several
types of siderophores, the main class of which are called pyoverdines (Cornelis and
Matthijs, 2002). Of these there exist three distinct structural types: types 1, 2 and 3.
Each strain of P. aeruginosa can produce only one of these types, and possesses the
corresponding type-speciﬁc pyoverdine receptor (Cornelis et al., 1989). Moreover,
considerable variation has been reported within each structural type (Smith et al.,
2005, Bodilis et al., 2009).
The question of emergence and maintenance of diversity in this biological system has
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been investigated recently by Smith et al. (2005). Their verbal explanation has much
in common with the chromodynamics mechanism. They argue that siderophore di-
versity could be a defence against exploitation by non-siderophore producing bac-
teria. In an environment of cheaters, it would be beneﬁcial for a mutant to pro-
duce a siderophore that is distinct in structure, unusable by the dominant cheaters.
The new altruists would invade, before the appearance of a compatible cheater
render them vulnerable again. This can result in a type of Red Queen evolutionary
race, in which cheaters chase the altruists when they acquire the ability to use the
siderophores produced by a strain of altruists, while the altruists constantly evolves
new structures of siderophores to escape the exploitation by cheaters.
Siderophore-producing bacteria are a very well studied biological system. So far,
most studies focused on the evolution of cooperation and virulence (West and Buck-
ling, 2003, Griﬃn et al., 2004, Brown et al., 2009, Alizon and Lion, 2011). None
of these studies take into account the diversity and speciﬁcity of the siderophores.
Chapter 4 and 5 of this thesis are thus completely novel and innovative to study the
dynamics of cooperation in this system. Also, these studies have a strong focus on
local competition and do not link the global competition to the local production. In
Chapter 3 I present a framework to model the evolution of siderophore production
that take into account both local and global competition.
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Chapter 2
Intermediate dispersal ability can
promote diversity in gynodioecious
plants
2.1 Introduction
Pseudogamy (also known as gynogenesis) is a peculiar form of reproduction, halfway
between parthenogenesis and sexual reproduction (Figure 2.1). It occurs in a wide
range of organisms, from animals to plants (Richards, 2003, Schlupp, 2005). In
pseudogamous organisms, an oﬀspring only receives the maternal genetic inform-
ation, but the embryogenesis must still be triggered by sperm (Beukeboom and
Vrijenhoek, 1998). For instance in angiosperms, where reproduction involves the
double fertilisation of zygote and endosperm, pseudogamous individuals develop
their zygote parthenogenetically, but the endosperm is fertilised by pollen, resulting
in a triploid endosperm. A classic example of plant pseudogamy occurs in gynodi-
oecious plants. In this breeding system, female individuals only producing ovules,
coexist in the population alongside hermaphrodites that produce both ovules and
pollen (Delanney, 1979).
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Figure 2.1: Schematic representation of sexual reproduction, parthenogenesis and
gynogenesis (pseudogamy). M refers to maternal contributions and P to paternal
contributions (Illustration extracted from Schlupp 2005)
It has been argued that males are a burden for sexual populations because they do
not make any progeny (Maynard Smith, 1982): they parasitise females' reproductive
eﬀort. In pseudogamy, this so-called host-parasite relationship is reversed: the male
is needed for fertilisation, but its genetic information is not transmitted by the
females. Thus, pseudogamy has been referred to as sperm parasitism (Hubbs, 1964),
or sperm-dependent parthenogenesis (Vrijenhoek, 1994). Alternatively, one could
consider this system as a form of cooperation via the production of a costly public
good, the pollen. In this light, the hermaphrodites are the cooperators, while the
females are the cheaters, because they can exploit the pollen without paying the
cost of production. Hence pseudogamy is not necessarily a cooperative system. In
this study I will consider that it is an act of altruism.
The coexistence of hermaphrodites and females is a paradox: because females do
not produce pollen, they should have a higher ﬁtness and hence invade population
of hermaphrodites. Simple models suggest that coexistence is not possible, and
that the system will always collapse due to the scarcity of pollen: females drive the
population of hermaphrodites to extinction, and as they need pollen to reproduce,
also go extinct themselves. However, if spatial structure is taken into account, i.e.
if pollen/seed dispersal is limited in space, coexistence is possible (Wilson, 2000,
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Stewart-Cox et al., 2005, Preece and Mao, 2010).
From this example, we can infer that assortment is very important for the coexistence
between cooperators and cheaters: if pollen can be shared preferentially with other
pollen-producers, the hermaphrodite population can survive despite being exploited
by the females. This suggests that the limited dispersal of pollen leads to an inclusive
ﬁtness argument (Hamilton, 1964, Dawkins, 1976). Another mechanism by which
cooperators could avoid exploitation by cheaters exists: kin discrimination. If the
hermaphrodites could evolve a strategy to discriminate against helping the females,
they would also do better.
In plants, discrimination can occur with the installation of reproductive barriers.
These include pre and post pollination barriers (See Rieseberg and Willis, 2007 for
a review). In gynodioecious plants, there is substantial phenotypic and genetic di-
versity, and pollen from diﬀerent sub-species cannot be used indiﬀerently (Goswami
and Matﬁeld, 1974), suggesting that discrimination occurs. In this chapter we will
explore the consequences of adding a pollen incompatibility system in a population
of gynodioecious plants. In particular, we will investigate if and under what condi-
tions a single type population can be invaded by a new sub-species, and if diﬀerent
sub-species competing for the same space can coexist in the population.
Our approach combines both the mechanisms of inclusive ﬁtness theory and tag-
based cooperation to investigate the consequences of limited dispersal on cooperation
and diversity.
2.2 The model
The model we use for our simulations is based on Wilson's model (2000) for the
maintenance of gynodioecy. It is a probabilistic cellular automaton, representing
a 2-dimension lattice (Figure 2.2). This is a model of perennial ﬂowering plants,
constituted of two types of individuals: hermaphrodites who produce both ovules
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and pollen, and pseudogamous apomict females, who produce only ovules, but still
need pollination to trigger embryogenesis. We also assume that hermaphrodite seeds
are all hermaphrodites, and female seeds are all females.
Figure 2.2: The probabilistic cellular automaton. Each pixel represents a cell. Red:
hermaphrodites, green: females, White: empty cells.
We assume that females are hermaphrodites that have lost the male function, which
is coherent with observations of rudimentary males organs (Couvet et al., 1990). We
also assume that females have an enhanced capacity of producing ovules, as they do
not pay the cost of producing male gametes (Lloyd, 1976, van Damme, 1984). In all
the simulations, we set the number of seeds produced at 4/hermaphrodite individual
and 5/female individual. Although changing these values modiﬁes quantitatively the
results, qualitatively conclusions are similar.
We assume logistic growth, limited by the amount of space to put down roots. When
one individual germinates, it occupies a site (a cell), and stays there until its death.
Thus cells are either empty, occupied by a hermaphrodite, or occupied by a female.
34
Figure 2.3: Schematics of the diﬀerent biological processes executed by the model.
Hermaphrodites and females diﬀer only by the process of pollen dispersal: females
do not spread pollen.
The biological processes included in the model are: dispersal of pollen, production
and dispersal of seeds, mortality of plants, and germination of seeds. Mortality is
assumed to be the same for both hermaphrodites and females. The model operates
in discrete time and uses synchronous updating rules, summarised in Figure 2.3.
The only diﬀerence in the processes of hermaphrodite and female reproduction is
that there is no pollen dispersal for the females.
Pollen and seed are assumed to be dispersed by wind. The dispersal is limited in
space, and each individual can spread pollen and seed in a given radius around it
(Figure 2.4). For simplicity, we assume that pollen and seed have the same radius
of dispersal. The number of cells a plant is interacting with depends on this radius.
For example, if the radius is 1 (arbitrary distance), each individual interacts with 4
others. If the radius is 2, it will have interactions with 12, etc. A seed can germinate
only in an empty site, and is randomly picked from the total seed pool arrived on
the site.
First, pollen is produced and dispersed by the hermaphrodites on the lattice. Then,
any individual that has received pollen produces seeds. Seeds are then dispersed
over the dispersal neighbourhood. If the cell is already occupied by a plant, the
seeds die. If there is no adult plant, one of the pool of seeds germinates to form
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Figure 2.4: Representation of the pollen dispersal. The hermaphrodite in the black
cell spreads pollen/seed in its vicinity. Each cell within the range of pollen dispersal
(the entire cell must be included in the range of dispersal) are represented by blue
cells and has an equivalent chance of being sent pollen to. We assume that pollen
can be spread in every direction. For example, here the radius of dispersion is 2, the
number of cells interacting with the black cell is 12.
an individual. Note that we included a process of plant mortality between seeds
dispersal and plant germination: if a plant dies it is immediately removed and the
cell becomes empty and available for germination.
2.3 Results
We will start by investigating the eﬀect of the dispersal distance of pollen and seed on
the level of cooperation in a single-type population (i.e. only one type of hermaph-
rodite and female). Then in the second part, we assume that a pollen incompatibility
system can arise in the population through mutation: hermaphrodites with a new
type of pollen unusable by the resident can appear and compete for space. We will
study the eﬀect of the dispersal distance on the level of pollen-type diversity.
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2.3.1 The eﬀect of viscosity on cooperation
Figure 2.5 shows the phase diagrams for diﬀerent values of the dispersal distance and
for diﬀerent initial conditions. For each value of d, the system converges towards a
stable equilibrium of hermaphrodite and female densities, determined by the carry-
ing capacity (the entire grid) and dependent of d. The proportion of hermaphrodites
can be interpreted as the level of cooperation in the population.
Figure 2.6 shows a negative relationship between the level of cooperation and the
dispersal distance: cooperation is favoured if hermaphrodites disperse pollen and
seed close to themselves (i.e. when the population is spatially structured). Moreover,
when d is very high (i.e. when individuals disperse far from their location), the
population collapses (Figure 2.5f). This is because the females get an overwhelming
advantage over the hermaphrodites and wipe them out. However, with the resulting
scarcity of pollen, they also go to extinction and the system collapses to the zero
equilibrium.
The dispersal distance sets the number of neighbours an individual can interact
with, for dispersal of pollen and seeds. Hence, it reﬂects the number of individuals
who can receive the pollen of a hermaphrodite. In order to spread, females must
be within the range of dispersal of hermaphrodites' pollen. When a female receives
pollen, she produces more seeds than a hermaphrodite, which allow them to colonise
more eﬃciently the ﬁeld. Females are hence advantaged when the dispersal distance
is important.
We have seen that hermaphrodites cannot persist if there is no spatial structure
in the population. On the global scale, hermaphrodites have a reproductive dis-
advantage against the females, eventually leading to their extinction. If we focus
on a hermaphrodite, it can set seeds if it is pollinated by another hermaphrodite.
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(a) d = 1 (b) d = 2
(c) d = 3 (d) d = 4
(e) d = 5 (f) d = 6
Figure 2.5: Phase diagrams of females versus hermaphrodites density, for diﬀerent
values of the dispersal distance d. The ﬁnal density is shown by the grey dot.
Parameters : grid size : 100*100, deathrate=0.01.
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Figure 2.6: The level of cooperation versus dispersal distance. The level of co-
operation is shown by the proportions of hermaphrodites in the population. It is
high for small values of the dispersal distance and decreases very rapidly for higher
dispersals. Parameters: grid size=100*100, deathrate=0.01.
Thus hermaphrodites would do better if they remain close geographically. This is
analogous to a kin selection argument: altruism can evolve if the beneﬁts of altruism
are disproportionately received by related individuals, which are likely to share the
gene causing the altruistic behaviour. In viscous populations, related individuals
are close geographically, because individual dispersal is limited.
We now add a kin discrimination mechanism: a pollen incompatibility system.
Hermaphrodites are now divided into subgroups (denoted H1, H2, ..., Hi,), produ-
cing a speciﬁc type of pollen i. Females Fi can use the pollen produced by Hi, but
not the pollen produced by the other subgroups. We will now investigate the eﬀect
of dispersal distance on the diversity of pollen types in the population.
2.3.2 The eﬀect of viscosity on pollen type diversity
At equilibrium, both populations persist globally. But the coexistence is spatially
and temporally dynamic: hermaphrodites colonise by spreading into the empty
spaces in clusters, while females chase the hermaphrodites. In this system, kin
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selection is blind: hermaphrodites have more interactions with each other only be-
cause they do not disperse far. But another mechanism could be of importance for
the evolution of cooperation: kin recognition (Hamilton, 1964). If a small num-
ber of hermaphrodite mutants arises in the population, having a diﬀerent pollen
recognition system that is incompatible with the dominant females, it will enter in
competition with the former population. Assuming all else is equal, on the one hand
they are in direct competition with the resident population of hermaphrodites, with
no intrinsic advantages. But on the other hand, they are free of female competitors
(at least in the beginning). This means that they could outcompete locally the
resident subpopulations, before being invaded themselves by a compatible female
subgroup (appearing through mutation).
The diversity in such a system will depend on a balance between generation of
new pollen types through mutations, and loss of such types through competition
between them. We ﬁrst study the eﬀect of the dispersal distance d on the ﬁnal level
of diversity in the population, represented by the Shannon Index. Here we calculate
the Shannon Index with the formula
H ′ =
R∑
i=1
−pilog(pi)
where pi is the frequency of altruists of type i, and R is the total number of types.
Surprisingly, we observe a maximum level of diversity for intermediate values of
the dispersal distance, and low levels of diversity for both low and high values of d
(Figure 2.7a). This is in contrast with our results on cooperation, and shows that
the criteria for cooperation and diversity to evolve are diﬀerent. In order to explain
why diversity is not favoured at low and high values of the dispersal distance, we
study the dynamics of a 2-type population (Figure 2.8).
If the dispersal distance is short, the population goes rapidly to a high cooperation
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(b) Corresponding levels of cooperation
Figure 2.7: Diversity and corresponding levels of cooperation versus dispersal dis-
tance. (a) The diversity is low for high and low d, whereas it is maximum for d = 3.
(b) Cooperation levels decrease but are higher than in the non-diverse model. Para-
meters : grid size=100*100, deathrate=0.05, mutation rate=0.001
level (high density of hermaphrodites). Here we observe that mutant hermaphrod-
ites cannot invade the population easily: they have no advantage over the resident
hermaphrodites, and though they have an advantage over the resident females (be-
cause they are incompatible), these are at a low density. It is thus diﬃcult for a
hermaphrodite mutant to invade a very viscous population (Figure 2.8a).
If the dispersal distance is long, the system goes rapidly to an equilibrium, with a
high frequency of females. Here on the contrary, we observe that mutant hermaph-
rodites can easily invade the population: they have an important advantage over
the resident females and can rapidly outcompete them. The invasion is so intense
that the resident subgroups are completely ousted of the population, and the system
goes towards an equilibrium with the new pollen type. However, if an incompatible
hermaphrodite mutant reappears, it can re-spread and create the same process of
invasion. Thus, the system is almost always monomorphic, which explains the low
level of diversity at high dispersal distance values (Figure 2.8b).
Finally, if the dispersal distance is at an intermediate value, the system favours
diversity: when a hermaphrodite mutant appears, it can spread and outcompete
locally the resident subgroups, but this time the invasion is limited and the res-
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idents are not ousted. This create a cycling dynamics, with alternate periods of
one hermaphrodite invasion, followed by its compatible female invasion, followed by
the new hermaphrodite invasion, followed by its compatible female invasion (Figure
2.8c).
In this model, the level of cooperation still decreases with the dispersal distance,
but if we compare Figures 2.6 and 2.7b we observe that cooperation decreases less
quickly with a diverse population (for instance for d = 3, cooperation is at 0.2 in the
non-diverse model whereas it is at 0.5 in the diverse model. Thus we can conclude
here that diversity is aiding cooperation.
2.4 Discussion
We used a simulation model to investigate how hermaphrodites and females can
coexist and how incompatibility can arise and be maintained in populations of gyn-
odioecious plants. We conﬁrmed the results that coexistence is favoured when the
population is spatially structured: dispersal has a strong inﬂuence on the densities
of hermaphrodites and females. High dispersal rates are advantageous for females,
which proﬁt more from hermaphrodite's pollen. Hermaphrodites have an advantage
with short dispersal distances, which allow them to remain close to each other, thus
preventing females from exploiting them. Furthermore, we found that pollen type
diversity is maximised for intermediate values of dispersal distance: low values of
dispersal distance do not allow diversity to evolve, because new hermaphrodites do
not have enough available space, and high dispersal distances give an overwhelming
advantage to the mutant hermaphrodites, which can invade and erase all diversity.
Our results on coexistence conﬁrm those of Wilson (2000) and Stewart-Cox et al.
(2005), who studied the maintenance of gynodioecy in regular and random lattices.
Moreover, here we also highlighted that this biological system is an example of
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(a) d = 2 (b) d = 5
(c) d = 3
Figure 2.8: Dynamics of a unique pollen-type population invaded by a new incom-
patible pollen-type. Hermaphrodites 1 and 2 are represented by red and blue lines
respectively, and the corresponding females 1 and 2 in green and purple respectively.
(a) For a short dispersal distance, (d = 2) the new pollen type remains at a low dens-
ity. (b) For a long dispersal distance (d = 5) the new pollen type invades very easily
and oust the resident. However, the former resident can re-invade, and the cycle
can go on. The diversity is thus low if we take a screenshot of the population at
any given time. (c) For an intermediate value of the dispersal distance (d = 3) Both
types coexist in the population, in a cycling manner: a hermaphrodite is invaded by
its corresponding female, which creates a pollen shortage. The other hermaphrodite
can thus invade in the population, before being itself invaded by its corresponding
female. Parameters : grid size : 100*100, deathrate=0.01, mutation rate=0.001.
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cooperation via the production of a public good, the pollen. In this light, we can
consider hermaphrodites as cooperators because they produce pollen, and females
as cheaters. Cooperation via a public good has been shown to occur in animals
(Packer and Ruttan, 1988) and microbes (Griﬃn et al., 2004), and studies on limited
dispersal concur with ours.
The existence of a pollen incompatibility system, however, makes that all individuals
cannot use all kinds of pollen. By continuing the analogy with public good coopera-
tion, the production of diﬀerent kinds of pollens, only usable by speciﬁc subgroups,
is an example of a tagged public good system (Lee et al., 2012). We can thus relate
our results on diversity with those on chromodynamics of cooperation (Riolo et al.,
2001, Axelrod et al., 2004, Jansen and van Baalen, 2006, Rousset and Roze, 2007,
Traulsen and Nowak, 2007).
In particular, we found that pollen type diversity is maximum for intermediate values
of the dispersal distance (i.e medium spatial structure). This result is diﬀerent from
Jansen and van Baalen's (2006), who found that diversity increases with weak spatial
structure. However, in their model, there is no empty space. This means that even
if an individual is capable to disperse far, it has no real advantage because the seeds
cannot easily germ. Thus, the invasion periods we observe in our model for high
dispersal, where a new type erases most of the diversity, does not occur in their
model, and the diversity hence increases with weak spatial structure.
In the absence of a pollen incompatibility, the dynamics of our system is very stable:
hermaphrodites and females go to a stable equilibrium of density. However, by in-
troducing mutations, we obtain unstable dynamics, with local spreading and disap-
pearance of phenotypes. Frank (2000) and Couvet et al. (1985) observed similar
dynamics, driven by the mutations, generating constant novelty for label/strategy
combination.
The mechanism governing diversity is very similar to chromodynamics: in a system
of cooperators and cheaters, with incompatibility between subgroups, we observe a
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kind of Red Queen process, where no strategy has a complete advantages over all
the others. A hermaphrodite Hα can easily be invaded by its compatible female Fα.
This female is then easily outcompeted by an incompatible hermaphrodite Hβ, itself
vulnerable to Fβ, and the cycle goes on.
Thus, we expect that a recognition system will appear in a population when the
level of cooperation created by dispersal distance is low: in a population with high
hermaphrodite density and few females, the global level of cooperation is high, so
that a new mutant has a low probability of invasion, whereas in a population with
low hermaphrodites and high female densities, the general level of altruism is low,
facilitating the invasion of a new mutant.
For simplicity, we linked the mutation rate of both strategy and label. However, it
is likely that these are diﬀerent. Moreover, in nature, male sterility is often caused
by cytoplasmic male sterility, which is determined by the mitochondrial genome
causing cytoplasmic dysfunction, whereas male-function restorer genes tend to be
determined by nuclear genes repairing the cytoplasm (Charlesworth, 2002, Eckardt,
2006). It would then be interesting in future studies to disassociate the diﬀerent
mutation rates in order to determine the role of each.
Our results can also provide a scope for sympatric speciation. We assumed here
a gamete recognition system, providing incompatibility between diﬀerent groups of
plants. We argue that barriers between groups can thus arise rapidly, hence leading
to sympatric speciation. Van Doorn et al. (2001) obtained similar results: in their
theoretical model, they found that sexual selection and sympatric speciation was
responsible for a rapid divergence of gamete recognition proteins.
Diversity in gynodioecious plants has been reported in previous studies. In particu-
lar, Laporte et al. (2000) found a high polymorphism of nuclear and mitochondrial
markers in populations of Beta vulgaris ssp. Maritime. In their study, they observe
highly diverse and structured populations, which they explained by the diﬀerence in
cytoplasmic male sterility and male fertility restorer genes. This provides a strong
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argument for the importance of these mechanisms on the emergence of polymorph-
ism in our model.
Examples of pseudogamy also exist in animals (Schlupp, 2005), but to our know-
ledge, diversity (as incompatible subgroups) has not been reported. Whether this
is because of a high spatial structure, or simply because studies are currently not
oriented towards the potential for diversity, remains to be studied.
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Chapter 3
The evolution of siderophore
production: a model for cooperation
through a public good
3.1 Introduction
Explaining the evolution of altruism and cooperation is one of the main challenges
in evolutionary biology. Populations of altruists are vulnerable to cheaters, who can
beneﬁt from the act of cooperation without paying the cost. For cooperation to
evolve, populations need to have structure, so that the beneﬁts of cooperation fall
towards individuals carrying copies of the altruistic gene, a mechanism called kin
selection (Hamilton, 1964). In viscous populations, in which individuals interact
mainly with other spatially near individuals, clusters are formed of more or less
closely related individuals. The presence of this structure facilitates the evolution
of cooperation.
Cooperation can take several forms. It can be direct, but it can also be indirect,
through the production and sharing of goods. If the good is accessible by all members
of a population, it is referred to in the biological literature as a public good (Rankin
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et al., 2007). A common, for example, is a land that can be jointly exploited, for
instance, by grazing cattle, by all with rights to do so. Exploitation of a common
beneﬁts the individual but depletes its quality. Because the costs of depletion are
carried by the community this easily leads to overexploitation and the tragedy of
the commons (Hardin, 1968).
Here we will explore how cooperation can evolve if individuals interact through the
use of a public good. The production of iron-scavenging siderophores by bacteria
is a well-documented example of cooperation via the production of a public good
(Strassmann et al., 2011). Bacteria need iron for their growth but soluble iron is
scarcely found in living organisms. In order to take up iron many bacteria excrete
siderophores, which are molecules that bind to iron. Once bound, they can then be
taken up by any cell with appropriate siderophore receptors (Ratledge and Dover,
2000, Wandersman and Delepelaire, 2004). This has been particularly well studied
for the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa, which produces the siderophore py-
overdine. Experimental work has shown that when iron is limiting, pyoverdine pro-
ducing strains reach higher densities than strains which do not produce pyoverdine,
yet when put in competition the pyoverdine producers are outcompeted, which shows
that there is a cost associated with siderophore production (Griﬃn et al., 2004).
Thus, because the production of these siderophores is costly, strains that produce
less or altogether no siderophores should be advantaged when competing against high
siderophore producers, and thus cooperation should not evolve if selection is dom-
inated by local competition. However, although non siderophore producers evolve
rapidly under laboratory conditions, they are rarely found in natural populations
(West and Buckling, 2003, Kummerli et al., 2009, 2010).
The evolution of public good use depends both on local and global competition.
Bacterial populations which produce more siderophores reach higher densities and
should therefore contribute more to the next generation. Studies have found a strong
eﬀect of the scale of competition on the level of cooperation in siderophore-producing
bacteria (Griﬃn et al., 2004, Kummerli et al., 2009, 2010). In these experiments
48
colonies are seeded from very few individuals, so local populations contain a high
proportions of related individuals. If competition is strictly local, there is little
advantage to a higher productivity because the competition will mainly be with
relatives. On the other hand, if competition is global, there is a strong advantage to
have a higher productivity because competition will mainly occur with non-relatives.
Previous theoretical studies of the evolution of siderophore production tended to
focus on local competition and did not link the global competition to the local
production in detail (West and Buckling, 2003, Brown et al., 2009). Studying the
evolution of siderophore production only at a within host level, although simple,
has a number of drawbacks. Firstly, it can lead to wrong predictions. For instance,
in Brown's model (2009), cheaters can always invade in well-mixed populations of
wild-types, because they always beneﬁt locally from the use of siderophores without
paying the cost of production. In this model, cooperation can thus not be main-
tained. However, in subdivided populations, or in environments such as studied in
Griﬃn et al. (2004), the level of cooperation will depend on the interplay between
local competition (the dynamics within a host or patch) and global competition (dis-
persal and colonisation of new hosts or patches). This creates a trade-oﬀ: cheaters
are better local competitors, so they outcompete cooperators at the host level, but
have a decreased productivity, so that their dispersal potential is inferior to that of
the cooperators.
A further issue is that these theoretical predictions are often interpreted in terms
of individual ﬁtness, based on the idea that the interaction between two individuals
conveys a certain amount of ﬁtness to the recipient, at a cost to the donor. In terms
of interactions based on public goods this leads to an interpretation of ﬁtness costs
only in terms of the physiological cost of producing the public good, and ﬁtness be-
neﬁts as the reproductive success that be gained by consuming the public good. How
these individual cost and beneﬁt translate into the costs and beneﬁts at the meta-
population level is not immediately obvious if the local and global dynamics are not
linked. Furthermore, the degree of assortment in a metapopulation, as measured by
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the relatedness, also depends on the local dynamics. This feedback is important for
the end point of the evolutionary process. Both the value of the unbeatable strategy
(ESS), as well as its evolutionary stability, depend on the parameters aﬀecting the
local dynamics.
In previous work we have shown that social interactions can lead to the emergence of
a diversity of competing types of cooperators and cheaters (Lee et al., 2012, this work
is presented in Chapter 4). For this model we assumed that all cooperators (and
all cheaters) have the same level of siderophore production, and hence, a strain can
be characterised by the type of siderophore it produces, and its strategy (cooperate
or cheat). However, there exists a high diversity of siderophore production rate
between diﬀerent strains (Jiricny et al., 2010). Here, we focus on the evolution of
the production rate of a single siderophore type. We assume that all strains produce
the same type of siderophore, but each strain is now characterised by its rate of
production. Similarly to Lee et al (2012), we determine if social interactions can
lead to the emergence of a diversity of diﬀerent coexisting strains. We formulate and
analyse a model for the evolution of siderophore production that takes into account
both the interactions at an individual and at a metapopulation level. The model is
based on similar assumptions as in Brown et al. (2009) for the local dynamics.
3.2 The model: description and results
The model is inspired by the Haystack model (Maynard Smith, 1964) and its math-
ematical analysis follows Jansen and Mulder (1999) and Jansen (2011). We consider
a collection of subpopulations inhabiting identical environments, which are referred
to as patches. At regular intervals (corresponding to a season or a ﬁxed time interac-
tion in a tube or chemostat) there is a round of dispersal and recolonisation (Figure
3.1). Thus we have two levels of dynamics: the local dynamics (what happens inside
a patch) and the global dynamics (what happens at the metapopulation level).
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of the model. Patches are represented by individual tubes
set-up as chemostats. First, the bacteria compete in each tube for a ﬁxed time τ
(local competition). Then, the solutions are harvested and put into a beaker. The
resulting solution is mixed and a ﬁxed volume is taken and put into new tubes
(global competition). The process can then be repeated after a time τ .
3.2.1 Within-patch dynamics
Within a patch several strains of bacteria may coexist. A given strain i has a density
of Qi cells, which produce siderophores with per capita rate bi. The production of
siderophores is costly and reduces the per capita growth rate of the strain by αbi.
We assume that iron concentration , denoted F , is low and constant. Siderophores
can be either free in the environment, or bound with iron. The dynamics of the free
siderophores is described by the diﬀerential equation
dS
dt
=
∑
j
bjQj − uFS − λSS (3.1)
where
∑
j bjQj is the total amount of siderophores produced, uFS the rate with
which siderophores bind with iron, and λSS the washing out of siderophores.
The dynamics of bound siderophores is:
dSF
dt
= uFS − θSF
∑
j
Qj − λSSF (3.2)
where θSF
∑
j Qj is the assimilation of bound siderophores by bacteria.
51
F Concentration of iron (constant) 10−3
S Density of free siderophores
SF Density of bound siderophores
Qi Density of strain i
Q Density of the population
K Carrying Capacity 1
bi Rate of siderophore production of the strain i 0 to 20
u Aﬃnity of siderophore to iron 1
λ Loss of bacteria (mortality and dilution) 0.01
λS Dilution of siderophores 0.01
θ rate of assimilation of siderophores 1
 Eﬃciency of assimilation of siderophores 1
α Cost of siderophore production 0.1
r Growth rate 2
µ Probability of transfer 0.1
τ Duration of local interaction 10
Table 3.1: Table of all the variables used , with their typical used value.
Next we describe the dynamics of the diﬀerent populations of bacteria. The dynam-
ics of a strain Qi is given by
dQi
dt
= Qi(r(K −Q)− αbi + θSF − λ) (3.3)
where r(K−Q) is the basic density dependent reproduction and where Q is the total
population of bacteria Q =
∑
iQi, αbi the cost of siderophore production, θSF the
successful assimilation of bound siderophores, and λ the washing out of microbes
(as would happen if the subpopulations are grown in a chemostat). Together with
the initial conditions for these equations this completely describes the within-patch
dynamics.
In order to describe the global dynamics, we need a solution for the within-patch
dynamics. An explicit solution does not exist but one can derive a suﬃciently close
approximation, based on Jansen and Mulder (1999). To do so we will describe the
dynamics in terms of the total local bacterial population Q, and the fraction fi of
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the population of strain i, where fi = Qi/Q. We can now rewrite the dynamics as:
dS
dt
= Qb¯− uFS − λSS
dSF
dt
= uFS − θSFQ− λSSF
dQ
dt
= Q(r(K −Q)− αb¯+ θSF − λ)
dfi
dt
= αfi(b¯− bi)
(3.4)
where b¯ =
∑
i bifi.
The equations for fi can now be solved (See Appendix 3.4.1 for the derivation)
fi(t) =
fi0e
−αtbi∑
j fj0e
−αtbj . (3.5)
With this we ﬁnd that the average siderophore production changes as
b¯(t) =
∑
i bifi0e
−αtbi∑
j fj0e
−αtbj . (3.6)
To proceed we assume that the cost of competition is relatively small compared to
the rate of basic bacterial growth (rK − λ  α). Then, the growth of the total
bacterial population and the siderophore pool is much faster than the competition
between strains of bacteria and we can apply a time scale separation. To do so we
assume that the total bacterial and siderophore densities go to quasi steady states
(denoted with tildes) given by

S˜(b¯) = b¯Q˜(b¯)
uF+λS
S˜F (b¯) =
Cb¯Q˜(b¯)
θQ˜(b¯)+λS
(3.7)
and the quasi steady state of the bacteria Q˜ can be solved from
rQ˜(b¯) = rK − αb¯+  θCb¯Q˜(b¯)
θQ˜(b¯) + λS
− λ (3.8)
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Figure 3.2: The dynamics of a resident being invaded by a competitor. The top graph
shows the density of bacteria in the patch. The middle graph shows the frequency of
the high siderophore producing resident (in blue) and the low siderophore producing
competitor (in red). The lower graph shows the mean production of siderophores.
As the competitor increases in frequency, the density of bacteria decreases because
there are less siderophores produced. Parameters: bres = 4, bcomp = 3.
where C = uF
uF+λs
. Note how all these densities change slowly over time with b¯,
which depends on time through equation (3.6) (Figure 3.2). If there is only one
strain present, then Q˜(b¯) is simply the equilibrium density.
3.2.2 Global population dynamics and ﬁtness
In the previous section, we considered the dynamics of a collection of strains with
diﬀerent siderophore production rates within a patch. In this section we will focus on
the evolution of this production rate at the metapopulation level, and ask whether
there is an unbeatable siderophore production rate, such that populations which
produce siderophores at this rate cannot be invaded by strains which produce either
more or less siderophores. To ﬁnd this unbeatable rate we will establish which strains
are evolutionarily stable by applying the approach used in adaptive dynamics, based
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on whether a strain with a given siderophore production rate can be invaded by a
rare mutant with a diﬀerent siderophore production rate.
As outlined above, we consider a discrete-time metapopulation of patches, where at
every time step the patches are inoculated with a variable number of bacteria. We
assume that the distribution of these inocula follows a Poisson distribution P(i, N)
with mean N , which indicates a random number in a ﬁxed volume as it would if the
inocula are pipetted from a larger volume.
We will start with the description of a global population consisting only of a resident
strain with siderophore production rate b. In all inoculated patches, the production
rate is therefore b¯ = b (we assume that the length of the interaction, τ is suﬃciently
long for the local populations to converge to their equilibrium densities). These
patches will thus produce Q˜(b) bacteria. There is obviously no output if a patch
receives no inoculum, which happens with a probability P(0, NT ) = e−NT . The
average production of bacteria per patch is Q(1 − P(0, NT )). If we further assume
that a fraction µ of these bacteria is transferred to the next generation, the global
dynamics of the resident is given by
NT+1 = µQ˜(b)(1− P(0, NT )) (3.9)
The dynamics will proceed to an equilibrium, which is the solution of
Neq = µQ˜(b) (1− P(0, Neq)) (3.10)
Next, we consider a rare mutant appearing in the population, which has a siderophore
production rate of b∗. The output of this mutant at the next generation depends
on how many of its propagules arrive in every patch. The distribution of mutant
inocula, is also random and therefore given by the Poisson distribution P(j,N∗T ),
where N∗T is the average number of mutants in the inocula in generation T . As
illustrated in Figure 3.2, the introduction of a new competitor in a patch will set
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oﬀ a process of competition and partial replacement, which will aﬀect the overall
bacterial density. The global dynamics are given by

NT+1 = µ
∑∞
i=1
∑∞
j=0P(i, NT )P(j,N∗T )Q˜(b¯)fres(τ)
N∗T+1 = µ
∑∞
i=0
∑∞
j=1P(i, NT )P(j,N∗T )Q˜(b¯(τ))fmut(τ)
(3.11)
where fmut(τ) and fres(τ) denote, respectively, the fraction of mutants and residents
at the end of the interaction, when t = τ . The average siderophore production at
the end of the interaction is given by
b¯(τ) = fmut(τ)b
∗ + fres(τ)b, (3.12)
and the total amount of bacteria in the patch is Q˜(b¯). The fractions relate to the
number of inocula, through (3.5), with the initial fractions given by fmut,0 =
i
i+ j
and fres,0 =
i
i+ j
.
Next, we make the standard assumption that the mutant is globally very rare, so
that the resident's dynamics are not aﬀected by the mutant (Metz et al., 1992).
The resident's dynamics will thus settle at the equilibrium value Neq. As the mutant
is rare it is very unlikely to have a patch inoculated with more than one mutant.
This follows from the Poisson distribution for which for small N : P(1, N) ≈ N and
P(i, N) ≈ 0 for i > 1. Using this the dynamics simplify to
N∗T+1 = µN
∗
T
∞∑
i=0
P(i, Neq)Q˜(b¯(τ))fmut(τ) (3.13)
The ﬁtness of a strain with a siderophore production rate b∗ in a population which
produces siderophores at rate b is thus
W (b∗, b) = µ
∑∞
i=0P(i, Neq)Q˜(b¯(τ))fmut(τ)
=
∑∞
i=0P(i+ 1, Neq)Q˜(b¯(τ))fmut(τ)(i+ 1)
(1− P(0, Neq))Q˜(b)
(3.14)
56
(a) Pair wise invasibility plot (b) Mutual invasibility plot
Figure 3.3: Diagrams of invasion. (a) Pairwise invasibility plot. Areas where the
ﬁtness of the mutant is positive are white and areas where the ﬁtness of the mutant is
negative are black. (b) Mutual invasibility plot. Black areas designate combination
of trait values that are mutually invasible. Parameters: α = 0.01, F = 10−3,
λ = 0.01.
where the last step uses the equilibrium condition (3.10) and the relation
P(i, Neq) = P(i+ 1, Neq)(i+ 1)
Neq
With this expression for mutant ﬁtness, we can construct a pairwise invasibility plot
(Figure 3.3a). This shows the region where a mutant with trait b∗ can invade a
resident population, with trait b. We can also construct the mutual invasibility plot,
showing the areas where both resident and mutant have a positive ﬁtness and where
strain with these traits can coexist (Figure 3.3b).
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3.2.3 Marginal ﬁtness and Hamilton's rule
The pairwise invasibility plot shows the existence of an evolutionarily stable point.
To ﬁnd and interpret the trait value for this point we will derive the marginal ﬁtness,
which is the change of ﬁtness with a small change of siderophore production rate
∂W
∂b∗
. To do so we ﬁrst derive from (3.5) that if the mutant diﬀers marginally from
the resident
dfmut(τ)
db∗
∣∣∣∣
b∗=b
≈ −ατfmut,0(1− fmut,0), (3.15)
and from (3.6) that
db¯(τ)
db∗
∣∣∣∣
b∗=b
≈ fmut,0. (3.16)
Because we only need to consider patches with one mutant inoculum we have fmut,0 =
1
1+i
. Putting this all together gives for the marginal ﬁtness
∂W (b∗, b)
∂b∗
∣∣∣∣
b∗=b
=
∑∞
i=0P(i+ 1, Neq)
[
Q˜′(b)fmut,0 − ατQ˜(b)(1− fmut,0)
]
(1− P(0, Neq))Q˜(b)
=
∑∞
i=1P(i, Neq)
[
Q˜′(b)1
i
− ατQ˜(b)(1− 1
i
)
]
(1− P(0, Neq))Q˜(b)
(3.17)
We now introduce the relatedness measure (See Appendix 3.4.2 for the derivation)
R =
∑∞
i=1P(i, Neq)1i
1− P(0, Neq) , (3.18)
which is the probability to pick two individuals of the same type from the same
patch over and above the probability of picking two of the same type from the
global population, relative to the probability of picking the same individuals in the
population at large (Queller and Goodnight, 1989, Jansen, 2011). With this we can
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rewrite the marginal ﬁtness as
∂W (b∗, b)
∂b∗
∣∣∣∣
b∗=b
=
Q˜′(b)R
Q˜
− ατ(1−R) (3.19)
In the ﬁrst term (Q˜′(b)R) we recognise that a mutant which produces more siderophores
gains a beneﬁt from the change of output from the patch: the share of the beneﬁt
is proportional to the relatedness. The second term ατQ˜(b)(1− R) is the cost this
mutant will pay through the decreased competitive ability, from its reduction in
growth rate that results from siderophore production. As competition amongst the
mutants is neutral, this cost is proportional to the number of unrelated individuals
Q˜(b)(1−R).
An alternative way of writing marginal ﬁtness is
∂W (b∗, b)
∂b∗
∣∣∣∣
b∗=b
= R
[
Q˜′(b)
Q˜
+ ατ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
− [ατ ]︸︷︷︸
C
(3.20)
in which we recognise Hamilton's rule. Remarkably, we see here that the ﬁtness
cost and beneﬁt are diﬀerent from the physiological costs and beneﬁts: the beneﬁt
consists of the increase of the output of a patch plus the beneﬁt of not suﬀering
from competition with related individuals. Also note that the cost and beneﬁts are
not constant but depend on the length of the interaction.
We can now easily calculate the candidate evolutionary stable siderophore produc-
tion rates from the equation RB = C. To do so we need to demonstrate that for
any value of b for which the marginal ﬁtness is zero, the solution is evolutionary
and convergence stable. This involves the evaluation of the second derivative of the
ﬁtness. We do this in the appendix and show that all candidate ESS production
rates are indeed evolutionary stable. Figure 4 shows the values of b at the ESS as a
function of the length of the interaction. The ESS value decreases rapidly when the
length of interaction increases.
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Figure 3.4: ESS value of siderophores production as a function of the duration of
the local interaction. The area in black shows all values where the marginal ﬁtness
is positive. Parameters: K = 1, r = 1, θ = 2, α = 0.1.
3.3 Discussion
We used a mathematical model to investigate how siderophore production evolves
when bacteria compete both at local and at metapopulation levels. We found that
diﬀerent strains can coexist stably at an ecological level. However, evolution leads
to a single unbeatable (ESS) level of siderophore production that does not allow for
the coexistence of strains with diﬀerent production levels. We found that the ESS
depends on the length of interaction between strains: invasion by cheaters, which are
theoretically better competitor, is dynamical; the longer the interaction, the easier
it is for them to invade. Also, we derived Hamilton's rule from ﬁrst principles in a
metapopulation. We found that the ﬁtness costs and beneﬁts are diﬀerent from the
physiological costs and beneﬁts deﬁned in our model. This provides an insight in
the processes taking place: a mutant obtains a beneﬁt, which is a change in output
shared by related individuals, and pays a cost only through competition with non-
related individuals. Finally, we found that all ESS are evolutionary stable. This
means that no branching is possible: cheaters cannot stably coexist with cooperators.
Most studies for public good production often implicitly assume total populations
being of a ﬁxed size. In such models the beneﬁts of increased cooperation are
60
cancelled by a simultaneous increase in competition for resources. In such inelastic
populations cooperation does not easily evolve. In our model however, the size of
a population depends on its strategy. Therefore, a cooperator will beneﬁt from the
production of public goods, and cooperation can thus be favoured, even in the face
of local competition. Moreover, the eﬀect of competition is modulated through the
length of the local interaction. If the interaction is long lasting, then competition
dominates and the ESS level for public good production is low. If the interaction is
for a short period of time, cooperation is promoted and high levels of public good
production arise. This suggests novel ways to evaluate the role of competition in
evolutionary studies in elastic populations, through a manipulation of the duration
of the interaction. Current methods to assess the role of competition are mostly
based on inelastic populations (West et al., 2002).
In our model, evolution leads to siderophore production that is dependent on eco-
logical factors, in particular on the interactions between diﬀerent strains. Because
there is a single ESS attractor, there is no lasting diversity and hence a cheating
strain cannot invade or establish itself if the population has attained the ESS. This
result is in agreement with the observation that cheating strains are rarely found
in natural populations, (West and Buckling, 2003), yet appear readily in laboratory
experiments (Harrison and Buckling, 2009), suggesting that such strains emerge, but
cannot invade the population. Moreover, our results also show why ultra cooperat-
ors (i.e. strains that invest highly in the production of siderophores (Brown et al.,
2009) cannot invade: although such strains have a high reproductive success when
they are on their own, they will lose out in the local competition against cheaters,
so that they cannot invade a global population. This follows from the ecology of the
bacterium and there is no need to invoke a a physiological limit to explain this (as
in Brown et al., 2009).
Even though there is no long lasting coexistence of cheaters and siderophore produ-
cers in our model, this does not mean that cheaters play no role in the evolutionary
dynamics. We have previously explained the important role that cheaters can have
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in the regulation of the diversity of siderophore types. Even if they rarely appear in
the population, they can stabilise the balance of the diﬀerent types of siderophore
by episodically counteracting genetic drift, and promote diversity (Lee et al., 2012).
In our model we tried to capture the essence of the biology and the ecological
interactions between social microbes, by linking their local dynamics to their global
distribution. We analyse the adaptive dynamics that follow from these interactions
and this allows us to derive an expression for ﬁtness from ﬁrst principles. Taking the
derivative to assess selection pressure on siderophore production results in a form
of Hamilton's rule. This leads to a number of important insights and advances.
First, most studies on the evolution of social traits start with postulating ﬁtness
functions. Central in the formulation of these functions is the idea that actions
have costs and beneﬁts, and these are therefore postulated. Because of the absence
of a mechanistic basis, it is often diﬃcult to explain these costs and beneﬁts in a
biologically meaningful and observable manner. By using an explicit and detailed
ecological model for the local demography, we can interpret the evolutionary costs
and beneﬁts that we uncover in terms of a change in local population density, and the
eﬀects of competitive replacement. As we have based our model on an ecologically
meaningful basis, both of these ﬁtness components can be interpreted in terms
of ecological interactions, which could lead to experimental quantiﬁcation. This
interpretation also shows that, for instance, the increase in the reproductive success
of a siderophore user is not matched to the decrease in reproductive success of others
(Taylor, 1992, West et al., 2002).
We derived a relatedness measure, which is equivalent to Queller's relatedness meas-
ure (Queller and Goodnight, 1989), and we show that it depends on the population
dynamics. Finally, because we have a full description of the dynamics, we not only
can derive the marginal ﬁtness, but we can also go beyond and consider the evolu-
tionary stability of the solutions we found. This involves properties of the population
that go beyond costs, beneﬁts, and the relatedness measure that we have derived.
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This leads to the important conclusion that selection in our model does not favour
lasting diﬀerences in the siderophore production rates.
Our results are concurring with empirical studies on siderophore producing bacteria,
at both local and global levels. For instance, Harrison et al. (2006), studying
infections in isolated hosts (i.e. local competition level), have shown that mixed clone
infections can favour the evolution of cheats, which result in a decreased mortality
of hosts. Other studies showed the same pattern: in local competition cheats always
have a higher ﬁtness than cooperators, and the less public good they produce, the
higher their local ﬁtness (Jiricny et al., 2010).
At the metapopulation level, Griﬃn et al. (2004) have shown that the level of
cooperation is highly dependent on the scale of competition and on relatedness. In
particular, they showed that when in competition (i.e. low relatedness), the cheating
strains were always favoured. However, their experimental set up did not take into
account the eﬀect of the time of interaction between strains. For longer or shorter
durations of interactions, results could well be very diﬀerent. Our analysis suggests
that to fully understand how cooperation evolves in a metapopulation, the length
of interaction must be considered in future studies.
This prediction is experimentally testable. For instance, the experimental protocol
could be similar to Griﬃn et al. 2004's, under global competition and low relatedness
(two competitors), but with the additional twist of adding the length of interaction's
dimension. For example, one could set two diﬀerent experiments with diﬀerent
lengths: short and long, and measure the frequencies of the competitors at each
time step. We predict that the frequency of cheaters will be higher for a long time
of interaction and the frequency of cooperators higher for a short time of interaction.
It would be interesting to elucidate whether the eﬀects of dispersal on relatedness and
competition always cancel out, as it appears to be the case in the some experiments
(Kummerli et al., 2009), or whether this conclusion depends on the length of the
interaction, as is predicted by our model.
An alternative experimental protocol would be to create/collect a wide range of
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strains varying in their siderophore producing rate (as in Jiricny et al., 2010) and
make them compete in a metapopulation. We predict here that the mean level of
cooperation (which could be measured by assessing the quantity of siderophores)
would be negatively correlated to the time of interaction.
3.4 Appendix
3.4.1 Derivation of equations 3.5 and 3.6
The diﬀerentiation by t of equation 3.5 gives
dfi
dt
=
−αbifi0e−αtbi∑
j fj0e
−αtbj +
αfi0e
−αtbi∑
j fj0e
−αtbj
∑
j bjfj0e
−αtbj∑
j fj0e
−αtbj
which simpliﬁes into
dfi
dt
= −αbifi + αfi
∑
bjfjj
using b¯ =
∑
i bifi we obtain
dfi
dt
= αfi(b¯− bi)
Equation 3.6 is obtained by replacing b¯ by
∑
i bifi in equation 3.5.
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3.4.2 Derivation of the relatedness (Equation 3.18)
We consider 2 alleles 1 and 2. We note φ the probability of picking an individual
which carries allele 1 in the global population. We note px the probability of picking
2 individuals which carries the same allele x in the local population. In a population
initialised by j individuals carrying allele 1 and i founders, the probability of
picking an allele 1 individual follows a binomial law given by
B(j, φ) =
 i
j
φj(1− φ)i−j
Thus we have we can determine p1 and p2
p1 =
∞∑
i=1
i∑
j=0
P(i, Neq)
1− P(0, Neq)B(j, φ)
(
j
i
)2
p2 =
∞∑
i=1
i∑
j=0
P(i, Neq)
1− P(0, Neq)B(j, φ)
(
i− j
i
)2
which simpliﬁes into
p1 =
∞∑
i=1
P(i, Neq)
1− P(0, Neq)
i∑
j=0
B(j, φ)
(
j
i
)2
p2 =
∞∑
i=1
P(i, Neq)
1− P(0, Neq)
i∑
j=0
B(j, φ)
(
i− j
i
)2
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Now Plocal = p1 +p2 is probability of picking two individuals of the same type in the
local population
Plocal =
∞∑
i=1
P(i, Neq)
1− P(0, Neq)
i∑
j=0
B(j, φ)
(
1 + 2
(j2 − j)
i2
)
which simpliﬁes into
Plocal = 1− 2
∞∑
i=1
P(i, Neq)
1− P(0, Neq)
i∑
j=0
B(j, φ)ji− j
2
i2
We can simplify
∑i
j=0 B(j, φ)
ji− j2
i2
into
i∑
j=0
B(j, φ)ji− j
2
i2
= (1− φ)(φ)(1− 1
i
)
Plocal becomes
Plocal = 1− 2
∞∑
i=1
P(i, Neq)
1− P(0, Neq)(1− φ)(φ)(1−
1
i
)
which simpliﬁes into
Plocal = 1− 2(1− φ)φ+ 2
∞∑
i=1
P(i, Neq)
1− P(0, Neq)
(1− φ)φ
i
The probability of picking two individuals carrying the same allele in the global
population is given by
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Pglobal = φ
2 + (1− φ)2 = −2φ(1− φ) + 1
We use the deﬁnition of relatedness given by Queller and Goodnight [1989], which
is the probability to pick two individuals of the same type from the same patch
over and above the probability of picking two of the same type from the global
population, normalised so that the relatedness is 1 if there is only one allele in the
population. Thus relatedness R is
R =
Plocal − Pglobal
1− Pglobal
which gives
R =
∑∞
i=1P(i, Neq)1i
1− P(0, Neq)
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Chapter 4
An evolutionary mechanism for
diversity in siderophore-producing
bacteria
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3 we found that evolution leads the level of siderophore production
to an ESS: there is no diversity for the level of siderophore produced. However,
siderophores are diverse in structure, (more than 500 diﬀerent siderophores are
known; Ratledge and Dover, 2000, Wandersman and Delepelaire, 2004), and are
speciﬁc: the siderophore receptor of a bacterium can generally only recognise the
peptidic chain of a single siderophore (Hohnadel and Meyer, 1988, Cornelis et al.,
1989, Spencer et al., 2003, de Chial et al., 2003), although some strains can recognise
multiple siderophore types by expressing diﬀerent receptors (Barelmann et al., 2002,
Ghysels et al., 2004).
How siderophore diversity has emerged and why it persists is not completely under-
stood. Here, we will investigate this question focusing on Pseudomonas aeruginosa.
P. aeruginosa produces several types of siderophores, the main class of which are
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called pyoverdines (Cornelis and Matthijs, 2002). Of these there exist three distinct
structural types: types 1, 2 and 3. Each strain of P. aeruginosa can produce only
one of these types, and possesses the corresponding type-speciﬁc pyoverdine receptor
(Cornelis et al., 1989). Moreover, considerable variation has been reported within
each structural type (Smith et al., 2005, Bodilis et al., 2009).
Smith et al. (2005) proposed an explanation of how selection could cause diversity
at the pyoverdine receptor locus: they argue that siderophore diversity could be
a defence against exploitation by non-siderophore producing bacteria. If there are
many non-siderophore producers, it would be beneﬁcial for a mutant to produce a
siderophore that is distinct in structure and then incompatible with the dominant
population, which would create diversifying selection on the pyoverdine gene (Smith
et al., 2005, Tummler and Cornelis, 2005). However, this explanation assumes that
non-siderophore producing strains are suﬃciently abundant to drive this selection.
The ecology and epidemiology of P. aeruginosa are not known in great detail, but
although there are reports of pyoverdine-negative mutants, these are normally con-
sidered to be exceptions. Indeed, such negative strains readily appear in vitro,
when cultures are kept for suﬃciently long time (Harrison and Buckling, 2009).
Pyoverdine-negative strains have been reported in cystic ﬁbrosis suﬀerers, but they
appear normally after a patient has been infected with a pyoverdine positive clone
(De Vos et al., 2001). Although coinfection of P. aeruginosa has been reported (Mc-
Callum et al., 2001) this suggests that infection with pyoverdine-negative strains
would normally arise through mutation from pyoverdine positive strains in the same
host. All these observations suggest that the natural abundance of pyoverdine-
negative strains is low, which raises the question of whether the defence against
cheating can actually explain the observed pyoverdine diversity.
Siderophores are secreted into the extracellular environment to bind iron and where
they can be taken up by any organism that has a suitable receptor. Clones of the
same strain share siderophores between them, but not with other strains. Hence,
siderophores can be considered as a receptor-speciﬁc public good. Assuming that
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the production of siderophores is costly, this public good system favours pyoverdine-
negative mutants. In the context of this public good game, not producing pyoverdine
is a cheating strategy (De Vos et al., 2001, West and Buckling, 2003, Harrison and
Buckling, 2009).
If a public good can be exploited by cheaters, a feedback may arise that leads to
signiﬁcant diversity. The reason is that strategies may evolve recognition schemes
to exclude the cheaters, as already hypothesised by Hamilton [1964]. Hamilton
also realised that such discrimination schemes themselves are vulnerable to new
cheaters. A number of studies have shown that this can result in a type of Red Queen
evolutionary race, in which cheaters continually attempt to crack the recognition
scheme while the cooperators continually devise new schemes to outrun the cheaters.
A siderophore's variable part acts as a tag used in recognition (West et al., 2007).
The dynamics that govern siderophore dynamics could thus be very similar to the
Red Queen's races reported in the studies of green beard genes and other tag-based
cooperation models (Riolo et al., 2001, Axelrod et al., 2004, Jansen and van Baalen,
2006, Traulsen and Nowak, 2007, Rousset and Roze, 2007).
However, as we will see, some aspects of the bacteria metapopulation make that this
system has a rather diﬀerent dynamics, leading to alternating periods of random
drift and episodes of intense selection. The interplay between complex population
dynamics and selection that favours diversity is even richer than previously thought.
The episodic nature of selection by cheaters has important consequences for the
design of experimental tests of the hypothesis that diversity is generated by social
dynamics, as we will discuss in some detail.
In the methods and results sections we will study the maintenance of siderophore
diversity using a mathematical model. For those not interested in the mathematical
details we will attempt to explain our results verbally in the discussion section.
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4.2 Methods: Model description
The model describes a set of hosts which can be colonised by bacteria. Some strains
of bacteria can produce a common good in the form of a siderophore, and the pro-
duction of siderophores increases the output of the colony. We assume that there are
diﬀerent strains of bacteria, each producing a diﬀerent type of siderophore and hav-
ing only the corresponding receptor for the siderophores produced: a strain cannot
use siderophores produced by other strains. The production of siderophores and the
expression of the receptor are controlled by diﬀerent but adjacent genes (Merriman
et al., 1995, Ghysels et al., 2004, Smith et al., 2005) (fpvA and pvds respectively in P.
aeruginosa). We will consider them as a single locus, since a single mutation would
obviously be detrimental because of a mismatch between the siderophore and its re-
ceptor. We also assume that there are siderophore negative strains, which have lost
the ability to produce siderophores, but are still capable of using the siderophore for
which they possess the corresponding receptor. Therefore we characterise a strain
by two traits that evolve independently: the strategy (cooperation or cheating) and
the type of siderophore it produces and/or can utilise. This conveniently captures
the functionality of the biology of the system whilst allowing mathematical analysis.
4.2.1 Within a patch: local dynamics
Patches colonised by a strain of cooperators are vulnerable to compatible cheaters,
because cheaters beneﬁt from the siderophores while not paying any production
cost. The appearance of compatible cheaters leads to the breakdown of cooperation,
as they invade and oust the cooperators. Patches colonised by the cheaters are
vulnerable to incompatible cooperators however, because these cooperators can keep
the beneﬁts of siderophores to themselves. Finally, because of positive frequency
dependence, we assume that a patch dominated by one strain of cooperators cannot
be invaded by a rare cooperator with a diﬀerent siderophore type. Similarly, cheaters
cannot invade patches of diﬀerent cheaters. Assuming local dynamics are fast, the
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Figure 4.1: Outcomes of the common good game. If a patch is occupied by a
cooperator, it is vulnerable to invasion by a compatible cheater (with rate φbC). If
a patch is occupied by a cheater, it is vulnerable to invasion by an incompatible
cooperator (with rate bA). In principle, the diagonal transitions (Ci ↔ Cj and
Ai ↔ Aj) are possible too through random drift, but this will be such a slow process
that it can be ignored.
transitions are instantaneous, and patches only contain a single strain of bacteria.
We will therefore characterise the state of a patch by the type of strain that is
currently inhabiting it: we denote Ai and Ci the fraction of patches that contain
cooperators of type i and cheaters of type i, respectively. Figure 4.1 summarises the
transitions in the states that the model allows.
4.2.2 Between patches : The metapopulation model
Patches are colonised by dispersing bacteria propagules, which are produced with
rates bA and bC by altruists and cheaters respectively. We assume that cooperators
are more eﬃcient in exploiting their hosts than cheaters (on their own), therefore
cooperator patches will produce more dispersers, and we have bA > bC . We diﬀer-
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entiate the invasion by cheaters in an empty patch and in a patch already occupied
by a compatible cooperator: as cheaters beneﬁt from siderophores already produced
by compatible cooperators in a cooperator patch, we could assume that colonisation
of a cooperator patch by compatible cheaters is facilitated by a factor φ > 1. For
simplicity however, we will assume that cheaters will invade cooperator patches as
easily as empty patches, so that φ = 1 and will thus not appear in the model (See
Appendix 4.5.1 and Chapter 5 for results taking φ > 1 into account).
New strains appear in the metapopulation through mutation. We describe two
types of mutation aﬀecting the local dynamics: with rate e, the mutation from
siderophore-producing to non-producing strategy leads to the replacement of co-
operators by compatible cheaters inside a patch, and with rate d, the mutation of
siderophore type leads to the replacement of cheaters by incompatible cooperators
inside a patch. Since the mutation of siderophore type needs a double mutation (on
the siderophore and the receptor genes), we impose e>d. We ignore all the other
mutation possibilities, as they are irrelevant for the local dynamics: for instance, the
mutation from non-siderophore producing strategy to producing would render the
mutant (now cooperator) vulnerable to the all-cheater resident population, and thus
it could not invade. Thus, an empty patch can change status when it is colonised,
a colonised patch can change status either by local extinction, by competition from
other strains, or as a consequence of the ﬁxation of a mutant. The dynamics of a
metapopulation with n types of siderophore producers are governed by the following
diﬀerential equations
dAi
dt
= (1−ΣA−ΣC)bAAi−mAi−bCAiCi+bAAi(ΣC−Ci)−Ai+ δ
n− 1(ΣC−Ci)
dCi
dt
= (1− ΣA− ΣC)bCCi −mCi + bCAiCi − bACi(ΣA− Ai) + Ai − δCi
with ΣA =
∑n
j=1Aj and ΣC =
∑n
j=1 Cj.
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Here, (1−ΣA−ΣC)bAAi represents the colonisation of empty patches by Ai,mAi the
extinction of Ai patches, bCAiCi the colonisation of Ai patches by Ci, bAAi(ΣC−Ci)
the colonisation of Cj(j 6= i) patches by Ai, Ai the conversion from Ai to Ci,
δ
n−1(ΣC − Ci) the conversion from patches Cj(j 6= i) to Ai. Similarly, (1 − ΣA −
ΣC)bCCi represents the colonisation of empty patches by Ci , mCi the extinction
of Ci patches, bACi(ΣA− Ai) the colonisation of Ci patches by Aj (j 6= i) patches,
δCi the conversion from patches Ci to Aj.
4.3 Results
We will start by assessing under what conditions new types can invade in the pop-
ulation and ﬁrst analyse the existence and invasibility of equilibria without explicit
mutation, so that  = δ = 0. We ﬁrst determine the equilibria of the system. Then,
we explore under which conditions a metapopulation using a single siderophore type
can be invaded by a strain utilising a new type of siderophore.
4.3.1 Equilibria
We denote A¯ and C¯ the equilibria for the total populations of altruists and cheaters,
respectively. We will only consider the simultaneous non-zero equilibrium for both
strategies (A¯ > 0 and C¯ > 0). Solving the equilibrium for arbitrary n yields
A¯ = n
(
m
bA + bC − bAn −
bC
bA + bC − bCn
)
C¯ = n
(
− m
bA + bC − bAn +
bA
bA + bC − bCn
)
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Figure 4.2: How cheaters disappear from patches when there is more than one type
of siderophore. First both Aiand Ci are going to equilibria A¯ and C¯. The appearance
of a competitor (Aj) drives the population of Ci to extinction and Aj settles in an
all-cooperator system (neutrally stable). Parameters : bA = 3, bC = 1.2, m = 1.
As A¯ and C¯ are proportions, feasible equilibria constrain between 0 and 1. For
a metapopulation with only one type of siderophore produced (n = 1), a feasible
equilibrium can exist, with cooperators and cheaters present. If we increase the
number of siderophore types (n > 2) however, there is no solution with 0 < C¯ < 1
anymore: the cheaters cannot stably persist in the metapopulation if there is more
than one siderophore type (Figure 4.2).
The fact that no diverse equilibrium is possible raises the question what will happen
in the long run when siderophore diversity increases.
4.3.2 Invasibility
Even if cheaters cannot persist in a diverse metapopulation this does not mean they
do not play a role in determining siderophore diversity. In order to gain an intuitive
understanding of their role, we now investigate the invasion by mutant types utilising
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a novel siderophore into a system which has a resident cooperator and cheater who
share a single siderophore (n = 1). We consider ﬁrst what happens if a mutant
cheater appears in the metapopulation. This mutant cheater has no advantage
because it cannot use the siderophores produced by the resident cooperator, and
therefore, it cannot invade (see Appendix 4.5.2 for a mathematical description).
Then, we consider what happens if a mutant cooperator that uses a new type of
siderophore arises in a population. This mutant is initially not encumbered by
any cheaters, so it has an advantage over the resident cooperator which is being
exploited by its cheater, and will invade the system. When this mutant invades, the
resident cooperator will decrease in density. Eventually, the resident density will
drop below a threshold density, denoted AT , which is the density value above which
a cooperator can support the presence of a corresponding cheater (see Appendix
4.5.3 for a mathematical derivation). As a result, the resident cheater decreases and
once it has gone extinct, the two strains of cooperators will coexist in a neutral
equilibrium (Figure 4.3). However, a cheater can reappear whenever one particular
corresponding strain of cooperators exceeds the AT threshold, triggering the same
mechanism to regulate the cooperators, protecting the emerged diversity. Thus,
although they cannot persist in the metapopulation, cheaters have an ephemeral but
important role in regulating siderophore diversity. The overall eﬀect will depend on
the level of the threshold density AT , the processes (such as drift) that allow some
cooperator strains to exceed this threshold, and the processes (such as mutations)
that reintroduce cheaters into the population. We will explore these eﬀects in the
next section using stochastic simulations.
4.3.3 Stochastic simulations
Mutations have a number of important eﬀects. The ﬁrst is that it may lead to genetic
drift, which has the potential to favour (at random) one of the cooperator strains.
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Figure 4.3: The role of the cheaters. Cheaters can appear in the population if
one of the cooperating strains exceeds a threshold density AT . The cheater of the
abundant cooperator increases and regulates its population, then disappears again.
The amplitude between high and low cooperators is reduced, and cheaters cannot
re-invade until the same process perturbs the relative frequency of the cooperators.
Parameters : bA = 5, bC = 3, m = 1.
The second is the occasional appearance of cheater mutants which, as we have seen,
protects diversity. The diversity in such a system thus depends on a balance between
generation of new types through mutation, loss through drift but also regulation by
cheaters. To study the dynamics of this diversity, we used a simulation model. This
simulation model is a stochastic version of the deterministic metapopulation model,
in which the number of patches is ﬁnite. Otherwise, the patch state transitions follow
the same rules as in the deterministic model (colonisation, extinction, competition
between strains, mutations), in discrete time.
We ﬁrst study the eﬀect of stochasticity in a polymorphic metapopulation of cooper-
ators without cheaters. Because all strains of cooperators are competitively neutral
with respect to each other, stochastic variation in the number of oﬀspring makes
that types eventually disappear. Unsurprisingly, in the absence of cheaters, the
metapopulation eventually loses all its initial diversity and becomes monomorphic
(Figure 4.4a) due to genetic drift.
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(a) Dynamics without cheaters
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(b) Dynamics with cheaters
Figure 4.4: Stochastic simulations for an initially diverse system of 3 diﬀerent co-
operators. Graphs show the cumulative densities of cooperators: A1in green, A2 in
blue, A3 in red. 4.4a: Dynamics in absence of cheating strains. Over time, some
strains disappear (A1 and A2) and eventually the system reverse to a monomorphic
population. 4.4b: Dynamics in presence of cheating strains. Strains vary in dens-
ities, but do not disappear even for a longer period of time. Parameters: bA = 5,
bC = 3, m = 1.
The presence of cheaters in the metapopulation has a protective eﬀect on the popu-
lation diversity: diversity is invariably maintained in all the simulations we carried
out (Figure 4.4b, 4.6a, 4.6b). This is in stark contrast with the results of our sim-
ulations without cheaters and shows how cheaters can act as a force against the
loss of diversity in siderophores types through genetic drift. Moreover, in agree-
ment with our theoretical analysis, while being critical to diversity, cheaters remain
at very low frequencies in the population, and increase only episodically. Figure
4.5 shows clearly the mechanism maintaining diversity: through genetic drift, one
type is starting to increase in frequency, reducing the frequencies of the other types
present. At some point, when the frequency of this cooperator crosses the threshold
AT , we observe some time later a short appearance of the corresponding cheater,
reducing the frequency of the cooperator below AT , before disappearing again. The
genetic drift is thus counteracted by the cheaters, which act as a regulating force
which is absent most of the time but appears when one of the cooperating strains
becomes dominant, thus protecting diversity.
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Figure 4.5: Dynamics for a 2-type system. In blue, cooperator and cheater 1, and
in red, cooperator and cheater 2. Fluctuating lines correspond to the densities of
cooperators, and peaks to the densities of cheaters. When one of the cooperating
strains increases in frequency, the other decreases. If one of the cooperators goes
above the threshold AT (black horizontal line), the corresponding cheating strain
invades, which regulates the cooperators, and then disappears. Parameters: bA = 5,
bC = 3, m = 1, N = 5000.
Figure 4.5 demonstrates how diversity is promoted and maintained by cheaters in
the metapopulation. But it leaves unanswered the question as to whether this di-
versity is bounded, and if so, to what level it is regulated. Figure 4.6a and 4.6b
show the eﬀect of mutation rates on the resulting level of diversity. High mutation
rates of the cooperating to cheating strategy () lead to high diversity in the meta-
population (Figure 4.6a). This is because the cheating strains appear quicker in the
population, preventing the disappearance of types through the genetic drift: if a
strain of cooperator increases in frequency, it is regulated when the corresponding
cheaters appear (Figure 4.5), but the delay between the increase of cooperators and
the appearance of the corresponding cheaters can lead to the extinction of other less
abundant types. The level of diversity also depends on the rate of appearance of new
siderophore types δ. If the new strains appear quickly, diversity will be high, and
on the contrary if new strains appears rarely, the diversity is lower (Figure 4.6b).
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(a) eﬀect of  on diversity
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(b) eﬀect of δ on diversity
Figure 4.6: The eﬀect of mutations on diversity. Simulations start with an initial
monomorphic metapopulation. 4.6a: The eﬀect of the cooperation to cheat strategy
mutation rate () on the diversity. Diversity is higher if the rate  is high. Parameters
: N=10000, δ=0.1. 4.6b: The eﬀect of the type-mutation (δ) rate on diversity.
Diversity decreases and is low when the ratio /δ is high. Parameters: N=10000,
=0.01.
4.4 Discussion
We used a mathematical model to investigate how siderophore diversity can be
maintained in populations of siderophore-producing bacteria. We found that cheat-
ers can play a crucial role in the maintenance and regulation of siderophore diversity.
Because siderophore-negative cheaters can act as a regulating agent, the cheating
strains increase in density if the speciﬁc siderophore they can use is produced in suf-
ﬁcient abundance, which results in a decrease of the cooperators that produce this
siderophore. The cheaters then disappear. This frequency-dependent mechanism se-
lects against all siderophore-producing strains that becomes suﬃciently dominant.
Our analysis suggests that this mechanism favours diversity even if the cheaters
occur infrequently in the metapopulation and at a very low density.
Our results thus support the hypothesis that siderophore diversity results from cheat-
ing, as suggested by Smith et al. [2005]. However, this hypothesis appears to rely on
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the selection pressure caused by cheaters, which often seem to be absent. Although
cheating strains arise readily in laboratory experiments (Harrison and Buckling,
2009), they seem rare in natural populations (West and Buckling, 2003). Is it then
possible that siderophore diversity has nevertheless arisen as an evolutionary re-
sponse to non-siderophore producing strains? Our model shows that this can indeed
be the case: ﬂuctuations from drift in the relative densities of siderophore can make
certain strains temporarily abundant. If this happens, non-siderophore producing
strains will be selected for and rapidly increase, and will reduce the density of these
abundant strains, increasing the densities of other producers of siderophores in the
process. This mechanism prevents producing strains from reaching very high or
very low densities and thus maintains diversity through episodic outbreaks of non-
siderophore producing strains.
Siderophore diversity is not regulated as a dynamic equilibrium, in which the forces
that increase and decrease the diversity counteract each other and balance out, but
as a dynamic process in which the drift in the population keeps changing the densities
of the diﬀerent siderophore-producing strains in the population. Only once a strain
becomes too numerous do the cheating strains emerge and does the regulation kick
in. With the hypothesis of all bi being identical, this implies that stochastic processes
play a key role: they govern both the drift in a strain's frequency and the appearance
of new mutants. The dynamics are thus characterised by an alternation of periods
of steady genetic drift with episodes of rapid and intense evolution. However, if
the bi are diﬀerent, the same mechanisms regulating diversity will remain, but the
dynamics will not be as aﬀected by the drift: the type with the higher bi will always
be the better competitor, going to the threshold and being regulated.
This is also found in other tag-based cooperation models (Axelrod, 1984, Riolo et al.,
2001, Jansen and van Baalen, 2006, Rousset and Roze, 2007) in which diversity res-
ults from non-equilibrium dynamics. If there were no incentives to cheat it would
pay all cooperators to produce the same type of siderophore, that is to equally share
the beneﬁts of their altruistic acts. Only when there are cheaters around it pays
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for cooperators to deviate from the dominant type and share beneﬁts with mem-
bers using the same receptor. This results in (locally) unstable dynamics governed
by rarity advantage and commonness penalty. In Jansen and van Baalen's (2006)
beard chromodynamics model diﬀerent types occur in amorphous clusters, leading
to a dominance of cheaters. In the model presented here types appear in homo-
geneous clusters, leading to dynamics in which altruists prevail. Whether a similar
relationship between siderophore production costs and tag diversity exists as in the
Jansen and van Baalen's (2006) model remains to be tested.
In our model, the ﬁnal levels of siderophore diversity depend on the mutation rates.
Moderate diversity can evolve when mutation rates are low, but high mutation rates
lead to a high diversity. This result is consistent with the discovery of hypermutant
strains of P. aeruginosa, which have unusually high mutation rates (Oliver et al.,
2000, Buckling et al., 2007), particularly for the mutS gene, involved in the DNA-
mismatch repair mechanism (Oliver et al., 2002). As in the classical Red Queen,
the mutation rate has the general eﬀect of speeding up the dynamics: cooperative
strains can escape their cheating corresponding parasite quicker, by producing new
types of siderophores, and vice versa, the cheating strains can acquire the compatible
siderophore receptor quicker.
Our results show that the diversity in the siderophore receptor locus can result from
the selection imposed by the episodic presence of cheating strains. This ﬁnding
has relevance beyond explaining siderophore diversity: a number of other organisms
have been suggested as having tag based recognition, for instance Saccharomyces
cerevisiae has genes (FLO) that cause ﬂocculation which is associated with social
behaviour (Smukalla et al., 2008). It has also been suggested that there is con-
siderable diversity in these genes, with closely related strains of S. cerevisiae often
displaying very distinct phenotypes, due to an unstable tandem repeat sequence
in the FLO1 gene (Verstrepen et al., 2004, 2005, Smukalla et al., 2008). Moreover,
mutation rates of the FLO1 gene have been found to be at least 100-fold greater than
the average mutation rates in the genome, suggesting that the same mechanism, as
82
the one we highlight here, is operating in this system. We thus suggest that diversity
in the FLO genes could also have emerged as an evolutionary response to the pres-
ence of cheaters. A further example are side-blotched lizards where the males form
cooperative mate-guarding dyads based on throat coloration (Sinervo and Clobert,
2003, Sinervo et al., 2006). Diﬀerent throat colours have been observed together with
the unstable dynamics in which altruistic and selﬁsh traits alternate in dominance.
Our results suggest that to better understand diversity in siderophores, or tag-
based cooperation in general, one needs to go beyond studying strains in isolation
or even snapshots from a population. One needs to investigate the change in tag
composition over suﬃcient time within such populations, and in suﬃcient detail.
Our analysis suggests that siderophore producers, such as P. aeruginosa, can serve
as an experimental model system to demonstrate how altruistic behaviour can go
together with the dynamically unstable behaviour known as chromodynamics.
The experiment is simple in essence: create a metapopulation of bacteria and allow
some movement between the patches. What we predict is that the diversity in
siderophores is more persistent if cheating strains are occasionally introduced in this
population. A further prediction is that the densities of cheaters will be negatively
correlated to the siderophore diversity.
4.5 Appendix
4.5.1 Inclusion of φ
If we take into account the facilitation of colonisation by cheaters in compatible
cooperator patches, the between patches diﬀerential equations become
dAi
dt
= (1−ΣA−ΣC)bAAi−mAi−φbCAiCi+bAAi(ΣC−Ci)−Ai+ δ
n− 1(ΣC−Ci)
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dCi
dt
= (1− ΣA− ΣC)bCCi −mCi + φbCAiCi − bACi(ΣA− Ai) + Ai − δCi
The equilibria are then given by
A¯ = n
(
m
bA + φbC − bAn −
bC
bA + φbC − bCn
)
C¯ = n
(
− m
bA + φbC − bAn +
bA
bA + φbC − bCn
)
In the main text, the cheaters cannot stably persist in the metapopulation if there
is more than one siderophore type (Figure 4.2). This result can change with φ > 1:
The maximum number of siderophore types nmax in which the cheaters can stably
persist increases with a suﬃciently high φ. However, if a new siderophore type
appears in the metapopulation (n > nmax), the stable equilibrium for the cheaters
disappears and again the cheaters cannot stably persist in the metapopulation (this
is studied more precisely in Chapter 5).
4.5.2 Invasion of a second cooperator
In order to study the possible non-equilibrium persistence of cheaters, we investigate
the potential for invasion into a single siderophore type system at equilibrium (n = 1,
but with both cooperator and cheater) by a mutant cooperator or by a mutant
cheater, utilising a new type of siderophore. We denote G(Xeq) the growth rate of
a strain X at equilibrium. At equilibrium, both densities of cooperator and cheater
residents are constant, so the growth rate is null for both the cooperator and the
cheater:
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G(Aeq) =
1
Aeq
dAeq
dt
= (1− Aeq − Ceq)bA −m− bCCeq = 0
G(Ceq) =
1
Ceq
dCeq
dt
= (1− Aeq − Ceq)bC −m+ bCAeq = 0
The invasion ﬁtnesses of a mutant cooperator Am and of a mutant cheater Cm are
given by:
G(Am) =
1
Am
dAm
dt
= (1− Aeq − Ceq − Am − Cm)bA −m− bCCm
G(Cm) =
1
Cm
dCm
dt
= (1− Aeq − Ceq − Am − Cm)bC −m+ bCAm
Because G(Aeq) = 0, G(Am) = G(Am) − G(Aeq). As at invasion Am and Cm are
negligible for they are rare, the invasion ﬁtnesses become:
G(Am) = G(Am)−G(Aeq) = bCCeq
G(Cm) = G(Cm)−G(Ceq) = −bCAeq
If a mutant patch Am appears in the metapopulation, the Am strain will invade if
its growth rate is positive. These mutant cooperators are not likely to invade A
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patches because of positive frequency dependence. However, because siderophores
make them superior competitors they win the competition against the incompatible
cheater residents, and hence they will invade C patches. The growth rate of Am is
thus dependent on the density of C, and is given by G(Am) = bCCeq.
If we conduct the same reasoning for a mutant patch Cm, we obtain that mutant
cheaters do not invade C patches because of positive frequency dependence, and that
they lose the competition against the incompatible resident cooperators, and hence
they cannot invade the metapopulation. The growth rate of Cm is also dependent
on the density of A, and is given by G(Cm) = −bCAeq.
It follows from this result that if the population contains cooperators and cheaters
which share a single siderophore type, a cooperator using a new siderophore type can
invade this population, because it will initially be free from cheaters. It will therefore
increase in density and (in absence of cheaters targeting the new siderophore type)
this will eventually result in the ousting of the cheating strain from the population.
Eventually, the metapopulation is constituted of cooperator patches only (Figure
4.2).
4.5.3 Reinvasion by cheaters
Although they cannot persist, cheaters are not always absent and have an ephemeral,
yet important, role: in this all-cooperator metapopulation, a cheater Ci can re-invade
if its invasion ﬁtness becomes positive:
G(Ci) > 0⇐⇒ (1− ΣA)bC −m+ bCAi − bA(ΣA− Ai) > 0⇐⇒ Ai > A¯− bC −m
bA + bC
This means that cheaters can appear and invade when their corresponding cooper-
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ators exceed a threshold level:
AT = A¯− bC −m
bA + bC
The invasion of these cheaters has the immediate consequence of lowering the dens-
ity of the corresponding cooperators, and when this density goes back below the
threshold AT , The ﬁtness of the cheater re-becomes negative, leading to their dis-
appearance. Thus, AT is the density value above which a cooperator can bear the
presence of a corresponding cheater.
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Chapter 5
The eﬀect of diversity on the
dynamics of siderophore producing
bacteria
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4, we investigated the hypothesis proposed by Smith et al. (2005) and
found that diversity can arise from the interplay between diﬀerent altruists and
cheaters. The mechanism we described explains the rarity of the cheaters: we found
that they cannot persist in a diverse metapopulation, because their invasion rates
is negative most of the time. However, they can invade in non equilibrium situ-
ations, when the densities of the diﬀerent altruists are very diﬀerent and one strain
starts to dominate the others due to genetic drift. The invasion of these cheaters
lowers the density of the numerous altruists, preventing the least numerous types
from disappearing from the metapopulation, hence protecting the diversity. The
cheaters then disappear, until the altruist densities become unbalanced again. The
dynamics are thus characterised by an alternation of genetic drift periods (without
cheaters), with episodes of rapid and intense selection (with cheaters). However,
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this analysis was based on a model for which we made the simplifying assump-
tion that cheaters invade unoccupied habitats as eﬃciently as habitats occupied by
siderophore-producing populations. But it is very well possible that invasion of hab-
itats of altruists is easier because these already contain siderophores produced by the
altruists. Indeed, in in-vivo infections of insect hosts by the bacterium Pseudomo-
nas aeruginosa, cheaters have been showed to be more virulent when coinfecting the
host with an altruist (Harrison et al., 2006). This shows that cheaters are capable
of using the siderophores to enhance their growth and dispersal.
Here, we investigate a variant of our previous model that takes the diﬀerential
invasion capacities by the cheaters into account: cheaters invade better in an altruist
patch than in an empty patch. In order to do so, we explicitly introduced a new
parameter φ which describe the relative increase of the success of invasion of cheaters
in an altruist patch, and perform a stability analysis for both cases, when φ = 1
and when φ > 1. This variant has diﬀerent dynamics than the previous model,
because it allows the coexistence of altruists and cheaters of diﬀerent type in the
metapopulation, under certain conditions. The stability analysis shows that there
is a neutrally stable diverse equilibrium without mutations. We then show that
this equilibrium becomes stable when mutations arise in the system. Finally, we
investigate how the diﬀerent dynamics are linked by analysing simulations, and ﬁnd
that the dynamics revert to a metapopulation of altruists regulated by cheaters
outbreaks when the level of diversity becomes suﬃciently high.
5.2 Methods: Model description
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n number of siderophores types 2
bA rate of propagule production by the altruists 3
bC rate of propagule production by the cheaters 1.2
m rate of patch extinction 1
 rate of patch conversion from altruist to cheater 0.01
δ rate of patch conversion from cheater to incompatible altruist 0.001
φ relative increase of the success of invasion of cheaters in an altruist patch
A total density of altruist patches
C total density of cheater patches
Ai density of patches of altruist strain i
Ci density of patches of cheater strain i
A density of patches of one strain of altruists at equilibrium
C density of patches of one strain of cheaters at equilibrium
Table 5.1: Table of all the variables used, with their typical value.
We use the model for siderophore diversity described in Lee et al. [2012] (See Chapter
4). The model corresponds to a set of patches which can be colonised by bacteria.
The bacteria can produce a public good in the form of a siderophore, and the pro-
duction of siderophores increases the output of the patch. Bacterial strains have dif-
ferent strategies and produce diﬀerent types of siderophores. There are two diﬀerent
strategies in the population: Either a strain produces the public good, and is con-
sidered an altruistic strain, or it does not produce the public good and is considered
a cheating strain. Additionally, a strain produces a speciﬁc type of siderophore and
has only the corresponding receptor for the siderophores produced: a strain cannot
use siderophores produced by other strains. Cheating strains have lost the ability
to produce siderophores, but are still capable of using the siderophore for which
they possess the corresponding receptor. Therefore we characterise a strain by two
traits that evolve independently: the strategy (cooperation or cheating) and the
type of siderophore it produces and/or can use. Bacteria compete on two levels:
they interact locally, inside a patch, and they interact globally, by dispersal in the
metapopulation.
The local dynamics depend on which strains compete inside a patch. Altruists can be
invaded by cheaters in a patch if the cheaters can exploit the siderophores produced
by the altruists. However, altruists are not vulnerable to either incompatible cheaters
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or diﬀerent altruists. Similarly, subpopulations of cheaters can be invaded and are
replaced by incompatible altruists because altruists are more productive and can
keep the beneﬁts of the siderophores for themselves. However, cheaters are not
vulnerable to either compatible altruists or diﬀerent cheaters. We assume strong
selection when bacteria compete inside a patch: There is immediate replacement
and therefore the state of a patch is characterised by the type of strain that is
inhabiting it at the end of the interaction: Ai and Ci denote the fraction patches
that contain altruists of type i and cheaters of type i, respectively.
Bacteria disperse in the metapopulation by producing propagules, produced with
rates bA and bC by altruists and cheaters respectively. Because altruists are more
eﬃcient in exploiting their hosts than cheaters (on their own), we assume that altru-
ists produce more dispersers than cheaters, so that bA > bC . Also, the two bacterial
traits (strategy and siderophore type) can be modiﬁed through mutation, which cre-
ates new strains. Two types of mutation aﬀect the local dynamics: with rate e, the
production gene is broken, so that a mutant cheater appears in an altruist strain.
Because the cheater proﬁts on the siderophores, this leads to the replacement of
altruists by compatible cheaters inside a patch. With rate d, a mutated siderophore
type appears, and the new altruists outcompete resident cheaters inside a patch.
Since the mutation of siderophore type needs a double mutation (on the siderophore
and the receptor genes), we impose e>d. All the other mutation possibilities are
ignored, as they are irrelevant for the local dynamics.
We will present the analysis of this model, with increasing levels of complexity.
First, we study a simpliﬁed model without mutation and with only a single type
of siderophore produced (no diversity) for which we show that altruists and cheat-
ers can coexist in a stable equilibrium. Then, we introduce diversity by adding a
new subpopulation of altruists and a new subpopulation of cheaters that use an
incompatible type of siderophore, and determine if these subpopulations can invade.
After invasion, the metapopulation is now diverse and has diﬀerent dynamics com-
pared to the non-diverse system. Two diﬀerent behaviours emerge depending on
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the value of φ. If we consider that cheaters invade unoccupied and altruist patches
with the same rate (φ = 1), cheaters cannot persist in the metapopulation, which
goes to a neutral equilibrium constituted of altruists only. But if we consider that
cheaters invade altruist patches more eﬃciently (φ > 1), cheaters can persist and
the dynamics will follow a cycling pattern. We will determine that neither cases
give a stable equilibrium. Finally, we will introduce mutations, and determine that
they stabilise the equilibria in both cases.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 System without mutation
We ﬁrst study the system with no mutation occurring ( = δ = 0).
In a single-type population (n = 1), the system is simpliﬁed so there is only one
type of altruists (A) and one type of cheaters (C). The diﬀerential equations are

dA
dt
= bAA(1− A− C)−mA− φbCAC
dC
dt
= bCC(1− A− C)−mC + φbCAC
(5.1)
Where bAA(1 − A − C) and bCC(1 − A − C) represents the colonisation of empty
patches by A and C respectively, mA and mC the extinction of A and C patches
respectively, and φbCAC the colonisation of A patches by C.
If we denote A the density of altruists at equilibrium and C the density of cheaters
at equilibrium, the equilibria are the couples (A,C)
(0, 0) (5.2)
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(
bA −m
bA
, 0) (5.3)
(0,
bC −m
bC
) (5.4)
(
m
φbC
− bC
bA + bC(φ− 1) ,
bA
bA + bC(φ− 1) −
m
φbC
) (5.5)
Equation (5.5) gives the only equilibrium with coexistence of both the altruist and
the cheater. The condition of coexistence is given by

0 < A < 1
0 < C < 1
⇐⇒ bA > bC
(
1 + φ(
bC
m
− 1)
)
(5.6)
We use standard linearisation techniques and Routh-Hurwitz criteria to determine
the stability of the equilibrium. The equilibrium is stable if the trace of the matrix
is negative, and the determinant positive (Kot, 2001). The Jacobian matrix JS for
this single type system is
Js =
 −bAA −A(bA + φbC)
bCC(φ− 1) −bCC
 (5.7)
Given that A and C exist, the Routh-Hurwitz criteria of stability are fulﬁlled, and
the equilibrium is stable. Figure 5.1 shows the dynamics of a single-type system.
First, altruists invade following a logistic growth. Then, cheaters invade, reducing
the densities of cooperators, and both coexist at a stable equilibrium level.
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Figure 5.1: Dynamics of a single-type system. The population start with altruist
individuals and a small fraction of cheaters. The altruists go to the cheater-free
density equilibrium (because the density of cheaters is initially negligible), before
being invaded by the cheaters. The system then converges to the equilibrium (A,C)
with the coexistence of both altruists and cheaters. Parameters: bA = 3, bC = 1.2,
m = 1, φ = 1.
We now investigate the potential for invasion into a single siderophore type system at
the coexistence equilibrium (Equation (5.5)) by a new altruist or by a new cheater,
using a diﬀerent type of siderophore. We denote G(X) the per capita invasion rate
of a strain X. At equilibrium, both densities of altruist and cheater residents are
constant, so the per capita invasion rate is zero for both the altruists and the cheaters
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
G(A) = (1− A− C)bA −m− φbCC = 0
G(C) = (1− A− C)bC −m+ φbCA = 0
(5.8)
The invasion ﬁtnesses of a mutant altruist Am and of a mutant cheater Cm are given
by

G(Am) = (1− A− C − Am − Cm)bA −m− φbCCm + bAC
G(Cm) = (1− A− C − Am − Cm)bC −m+ φbCAm − bAA
(5.9)
Because G(A) = 0 and G(C) = 0, we have G(Am) = G(Am)−G(A) and G(Cm) =
G(Cm)−G(C) = 0. As at invasion Am and Cm are negligible because they are rare,
the invasion rates become

G(Am) = (φbC + bA)C
G(Cm) = −(φbC + bA)A
(5.10)
If a new strain Am appears in the metapopulation, the Am strain will invade be-
cause its invasion rate is positive (Equation (5.10)). These new altruists win the
competition against the incompatible cheater residents, and hence they invade C
patches. If we conduct the same reasoning for a new patch Cm, we obtain that new
cheaters do not invade (at least not before the mutant altruists have settled into the
metapopulation) because their invasion rate is negative.
The invasion of a new altruist leads to very diﬀerent dynamics. Two possibilities
arise: either the new altruist ousts the resident cheater and the metapopulation
becomes all-altruist, or the diﬀerent subpopulations coexist. We will now analyse
the conditions leading to either cases.
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5.3.2 Multiple-type system
The metapopulation becomes diverse when the second type invades it. We now note
A and C the total densities of altruists and cheaters, respectively. Because cheaters
are vulnerable to incompatible altruists, the diﬀerential equations become

dAi
dt
= bAAi(1− A− C)−mAi − φbCAiCi + bAAi(C − Ci)
dCi
dt
= bCCi(1− A− C)−mCi + φbCAiCi − bACi(A− Ai)
(5.11)
where bAAi(C − Ci) and bACi(A − Ai) represents the colonisation of patches of
cheaters by incompatible altruists.
We can determine the equilibrium where all strains of altruists have the same density
A and all strains of cheaters have the same density C. The equilibria are the couples
(A,C)
(0, 0) (5.12)
(
bA −m
bAn
, 0) (5.13)
(0,
bC −m
bCn
) (5.14)
(
m
bA + φbC − bAn −
bC
bA + φbC − bCn,
bA
bA + φbC − bCn −
m
bA + φbC − bAn) (5.15)
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Beside the trivial equilibrium, the system goes to either equilibrium (5.13), (5.14)
or (5.15), depending on whether altruists and cheaters can both persist in the meta-
population or not. To determine this, we analyse if a cheater can invade in a meta-
population at the multi-altruist equilibrium (5.13), where all altruists have the same
density, and also if an altruist can invade in a metapopulation at the multi-cheater
equilibrium (5.14), where similarly all cheaters have the same density. The invasion
rates of an altruist strain Ai in a metapopulation of cheaters, and of a cheating
strain Ci in a metapopulation of altruists, are respectively

G(Ai) = (1− nC)bA −m− φbCC + bAC(n− 1)
G(Ci) = (1− nA)bC −m+ φbCA− bAA(n− 1)
(5.16)
A necessary condition for the multiple-type equilibrium to exist is that both invasion
rates are positive. Using Equilibria (5.13) and (5.14), the conditions are

G(Ai) > 0⇐⇒ bA −m− (bA + φbC)(bC −m)
bCn
> 0
G(Ci) > 0⇐⇒ (bA + φbC)(bA −m)− b
2
An+ nmbC
nbA
> 0
(5.17)
5.3.3 The eﬀect of φ
If φ = 1, conditions in equation (5.17) cannot be fulﬁlled simultaneously: the multi-
type equilibrium (5.15) never exists. More precisely, as the cheaters have a negative
invasion rate, they cannot stably persist in the metapopulation if there is more than
one siderophore type. It follows from this result that if the population contains
altruists and cheaters which share a single siderophore type, an altruist using a new
siderophore type can invade this population, because it will initially be free from
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cheaters. It will therefore increase in density and (in absence of cheaters targeting
the new siderophore type) this will eventually result in the ousting of the cheating
strain from the population. Eventually, the metapopulation is constituted of altruist
patches only (Figure 5.2).The multiple altruist equilibrium (5.13) is thus a neutral
equilibrium.
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Figure 5.2: Dynamics of a single-type system invaded by a second type (no muta-
tions). With a non-zero initial population of cheaters C1, The system ﬁrst converges
to the (A,C) equilibrium. When a new altruist appears, it ousts the cheaters from
the metapopulation, and both altruists settle in an all-altruist system (neutrally
stable). The system does not converge to the two-altruist equilibrium. Parameters:
bA = 3 , bC = 1.2 , m = 1, φ = 1.
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The results change importantly if φ > 1, as now the multiple type equilibrium (5.15)
can exist. Both conditions in (5.17) are fulﬁlled if
bAm+ b
2
A(n− 1)− nbCm
bC(bA −m) < φ <
(bA −m)n
bC −m −
bA
bC
(5.18)
Figure 5.3 shows an illustration of the eﬀect of φ on the invasion rates of equa-
tion (5.16). If φ is too small, the cheaters cannot invade and the metapopulation
is altruist-only. If φ is too large, the altruists cannot invade and the metapopula-
tion is cheater-only. For a certain range, both invasion rates are positive: there is
coexistence of several types of altruists and cheaters.
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Figure 5.3: The eﬀect of φ on the invasion rate of altruists and cheaters (Equation
5.16). If φ is too low, cheaters invasion rate is negative: they cannot invade the
metapopulation, which is thus constituted of altruist-only patches. On the contrary,
if φ is too large, altruists invasion rate is negative: they are ousted of the meta-
population, thus constituted of cheater-only patches. Inbetween, Several types of
altruists and cheaters can coexist. Parameters: bA = 5.5 , bC = 1.5 , m = 1, n = 2.
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5.3.4 The eﬀect of increasing diversity
Thus, two types of dynamics are possible, depending on the value of φ: on the
one hand if we don't take into account an improved capacity of invasion when
cheaters invade an altruist patch (φ = 1) then the dynamics present a neutrally
stable equilibrium. On the other hand if cheaters invade better patches of altruists
(φ > 1), then we can observe a cycling behaviour. But the dynamics (5.15) also
depend on the number of types in the metapopulation. When diversity increases
(i.e. when a new type of siderophore arises in the metapopulation), the minimum
value of φ for which the equilibrium exists also increases. This means that the cycling
behaviours which could exist for a given value of n would disappear when n becomes
larger (Figure 5.4). Thus the metapopulation would go back to equilibrium (5.13):
a neutral equilibrium. Note that if the value of φ exceeds the maximum value, the
metapopulation goes to the cheaters neutral equilibrium (5.14).
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Figure 5.4: The eﬀect diversity on the minimum (φmin) and maximum (φmax) value
of φ for which a multiple-type equilibrium exists. Both φmin and φmax increases
when n increases. Parameters: bA = 5.5 , bC = 1.5 , m = 1.
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We can now determine the stability of the multiple type equilibrium (5.15) with a
stability analysis.
5.3.5 Stability analysis
The linearisation of the complete system is presented in Appendix 5.5.1. To de-
termine the Jacobian matrix from the linearised equations for any number of types
is possible but becomes diﬃcult for large n. To simplify the problem, we will in-
troduce a transformation of variables, by considering the total density of altruists
and cheaters, denoted A and C, and the deviation from the mean, denoted A′ and
C ′ (Note that A′ =
A
n
− Ai and C ′ = C
n
− Ci). This transformation achieves a
decoupling of the system (See Jansen and Lloyd, 2000).
The linearised dynamics of the total densities of altruists and cheaters are

dA
dt
=
(−nbAA)A− A(bA + φbC)C
dC
dt
=
(
C ((bA + φbC)− (bA + bC)n)
)
A+−nbCCC
(5.19)
and the linearised dynamics for the deviation from the mean are

dA′
dt
= −A(bA + φbC)C ′
dC ′
dt
= C(bA + φbC)A
′
(5.20)
The Jacobian matrix is determined by the partial derivatives of the variables that
describe the system. The Jacobian matrix can be written as a block matrix:
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J =

H
J1
J2
. . .
Jn

(5.21)
Because every types have the same demography, they have the same description as
deviation from the mean: all the Ji are identical. We have
H =

∂
dA
dt
∂A
∂
dA
dt
∂C
∂
dC
dt
∂A
∂
dC
dt
∂C
 =
 −nbAA −A(bA + φbC)
C ((bA + φbC)− (bA + bC)n) −nbCC

(5.22)
Ji =

∂
dA′i
dt
∂A′i
∂
dA′i
dt
∂C ′i
∂
dC ′i
dt
∂A′i
∂
dC ′i
dt
∂C ′i
 =
 0 −A(bA + φbC)
C(bA + φbC) 0
 (5.23)
Because all blocks are independent (the oﬀ diagonal blocks are zero), the overall
stability of the equilibrium can be determined by studying the stability of each
block. The H block gives

Tr(H) = −nbAA− nbCC < 0
Det(H) = AC (n2bAbC + (bA + φbC)(bA + φbC − (bA + bC)n))
(5.24)
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The determinant is positive in the range of the multiple-type equilibrium (5.15) (See
the proof in Appendix 5.5.2).
The Ji block gives

Tr(Ji) = 0
Det(Ji) = AC(bA + φbC)
2 > 0
(5.25)
The determinant of Ji is positive but the trace is zero. This means that the system
has a pair of complex eigenvalues with zero real parts. Although the multiple-type
equilibrium exists, the diﬀerent subpopulations of altruists and cheaters need not
converge towards the equilibrium. Instead, the dynamics follows a cycling pattern
around the multiple-type equilibrium (Figure 5.5).
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Figure 5.5: Dynamics of a two-type system at the two-altruist equilibrium invaded
by cheaters. If the two-cheater equilibrium exists, cheaters invade and the dynamics
follow a cycling pattern with alternate period of high and low amplitudes for both
types. Both types cycle around the equilibria, but the system does not converge to
the two-altruist equilibrium. Parameters: bA = 5.5 , bC = 1.5 , m = 1 , φ = 5.
5.3.6 The eﬀect of mutations in a multiple-type system
We now investigate the eﬀect of mutations on the dynamics previously determined.
The complete system for any number of siderophore types is

dAi
dt
= bAAi(1− A− C)−mAi − φbCAiCi + bAAi(C − Ci)− Ai + δ
n− 1(C − Ci)
dCi
dt
= bCCi(1− A− C)−mCi + φbCAiCi − bACi(A− Ai) + Ai − δCi
(5.26)
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where Ai is the conversion from Ai to Ci ,
δ
n−1(Ĉ − Ci) is the conversion from
patches Cj(j 6= i) to Ai and δCi the conversion from patches Ci to Aj .
The equilibrium is only needed to determine the linearised equation and is given in
Appendix 5.5.1. The blocks of the Jacobian matrix becomes
H ′ =
 −nbAA− δ
C
A
δ − A(bA + φbC)
C ((bA + φbC)− (bA + bC)n) +  −nbCC − A
C
 (5.27)
J
′
i =
 −δ
C
A
−A(bA + φbC)− δ
n− 1
C(bA + φbC) +  −A
C
 (5.28)
If  and δ are much smaller than the other variables, the properties of H ′ and H are
similar, in that Tr(H ′) < 0 and Det(H ′) > 0. We now look at the J
′
i block:

Tr(J
′
i ) = −δ
C
A
− A
C
< 0
Det(J
′
i ) = δ+
(
C(bA + φbC) + 
)(
A(bA + φbC) +
δ
n− 1
)
> 0
(5.29)
Mutations render the trace negative. Both subsystems now satisfy the Routh-
Hurwitz criteria, and the equilibrium becomes stable. Figure 5.6 and 5.7 show the
dynamics of a multiple-type system (with n = 2) with φ = 1 and φ > 1 respectively.
We have seen that when φ = 1, cheaters cannot persist stably in the metapopulation.
However, mutations cause a small but continuous presence of cheaters. Initially, two
altruists can be at diﬀerent density levels, but they converge towards the stable equi-
librium A because of the continuous presence of cheaters, who converge towards the
stable equilibrium C (Figure 5.6).
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(a) Densities
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Figure 5.6: Dynamics of a single-type system invaded by a second type, with muta-
tions. Initially, the two cooperators have diﬀerent densities in the metapopulation,
but because of the presence of cheaters, they converge towards the altruist equilib-
rium. Cheaters also converge towards the cheaters equilibrium, which is non-zero
due to the mutations. Parameters: bA=3 , bC = 1.2 , m = 1, φ = 1.
We have seen that when φ > 1 the dynamics follow a cycling pattern because of
Equation (5.25). Mutations now allows a small negative trace (Equation (5.29)),
which stabilises the system: the cycles disappear and the system converges to the
now stable equilibria A and C (Figure 5.7).
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Figure 5.7: Dynamics of a two-type system with mutations. Mutations stabilise
the system: altruists and cheaters converge towards the multi-type equilibrium with
mutations. Parameters: bA = 5.5 , bC = 1.5 , m = 1 , φ = 5 .
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5.3.7 Stochastic simulation
We can observe the dynamics revealed by the deterministic model by using a sim-
ulation model. This simulation model is a stochastic version of the deterministic
model, in which the number of patches is ﬁnite. It takes the parameters set in ﬁgure
5.4, and we ﬁxed the φ parameter at 5.5. We start with a monomorphic popula-
tion of altruist. At the single type population, the altruist cannot persist and is
invaded by its compatible cheater. The metapopulation thus goes to the single type
cheater equilibrium. If a mutant altruist appears without its cheater, it invades and
ousts the resident cheater. But if it appears with its compatible cheater, it results
in the coexistence of all subpopulations, with a cycling behaviour. The increase of
diversity at this level of φ leads to the system changing to an altruists only equilib-
rium. So when a third altruist appears, the cycling behaviour disappears and the
cheaters disappear of the metapopulation. The diﬀerent subpopulations of altruists
are neutral with respect to each others, but are now subject to genetic drift. At
this point we recover previous results: diversity does not decrease because of the
regulatory action of the cheaters (See Lee et al., 2012).
5.4 Discussion
We used a mathematical model to investigate the stability of equilibria under dif-
ferent conditions in siderophore producing bacteria. We found that in a single
siderophore type metapopulation, the equilibrium is stable and coexistence between
altruists and cheaters occurs if the advantage gained by producing siderophores is
suﬃcient. In a multiple type metapopulation without mutation, there is a strong ef-
fect of φ. If we assume that cheaters do not invade altruist patches more easily than
empty patches (φ = 1), we found that the altruist equilibrium is neutrally stable:
diﬀerent altruists can coexist, but a slight perturbation (for example the arrival of
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Figure 5.8: Stochastic simulation of the metapopulation model. The top graph
corresponds to the densities of the diﬀerent subpopulations of altruists, and the
graph below to the subpopulations of cheaters. We start with a single population
of altruists. The dynamics is stable with a single type, then it switches to a cycling
behaviour when n = 2, and ﬁnally goes to an all-altruist diverse equilibrium without
cheaters. Thus the behaviour of the system depends on the number of diﬀerent types
of subpopulations. Parameters: bA = 5.5 , bC = 1.5 , m = 1, φ = 5.5.
cheaters of one type) changes the densities of the diﬀerent altruists. The cheater
equilibrium does not exist however and cheaters do not persist in the metapopula-
tion. But by considering that cheaters beneﬁt from the siderophores already present
in a compatible altruist patch, by producing more propagules (φ > 1), we found
that a non zero equilibrium for altruists and cheaters can exist if φ is suﬃciently
high. However, this equilibrium is neither stable nor unstable, and the dynamics
show oscillating behaviours. By introducing mutations, we found that the system
becomes stable in both cases: if (φ = 1), mutations stabilise the equilibrium, by
allowing a continuous and very low density of cheaters patches to exist. If (φ > 1),
the cycling pattern attenuates and eventually disappears.
Our results concur and complete the results obtained in Lee et al. (2012). We
previously found that cheaters could not persist in a diverse metapopulation if we
assumed that cheaters invade unoccupied and altruist patches with the same rate.
This need not be true as cheaters potentially could invade altruist patches more
easily because of the siderophores present in these patches. By relaxing this as-
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sumption, we uncovered a richer dynamics than in the original model. The type
of dynamics depends on the diversity in the metapopulation: it is possible to have
coexistence of diﬀerent altruists and cheaters for a low to intermediate level of di-
versity, but eventually the cheaters disappear as diversity increases and the system
reverts back to a metapopulation dominated by diﬀerent types of altruists, subjected
to genetic drift and regulated by cheaters. Our variant is thus robust with respect
to the inﬂuence of φ.
Siderophore diversity is a form of kin recognition. It has been stated that kin
recognition erodes the diversity that underlies the recognition system, a result known
as Crozier's paradox (Crozier, 1986). In the model studied here we found that the
diversity is protected by the presence of cheaters. The way this works is that,
after diversity has increased, the dynamics settle on a state in which the altruist
populations consist of a more or less evenly distribution of siderophore types. Once
a single type gets too dominant, cheaters appear that will reduce the density of this
siderophore type, restoring the more or less even distribution. As in Jansen and van
Baalen (2006) and Lee et al. (2012) the diversity of recognition signals is maintained
through chromodynamics: a dynamic process of regulation. This provides a solution
to Crozier's paradox. We argue that this non-equilibrium process could regulate the
diversity in many species.
Cheaters are rare in natural populations (West and Buckling, 2003). We hypothesise
that this is because the level of diversity is high in these natural populations. It is
thus not likely to observe cycles of cheaters invasions in these conditions. However,
it would be possible to observe these cycles in non natural conditions, for example
in populations of human patients suﬀering from cystic ﬁbrosis. Indeed, infection
control measures are often set up in order to prevent cross infections from patient
to patient (Saiman and Siegel, 2004), so that contacts between patients are limited.
Observing these cycles could also be possible in experimental conditions, where the
diversity can be artiﬁcially maintained at intermediate levels.
Our model predicts that the level of cooperation depends on the diversity. The
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hypothesis can be easily veriﬁed by setting experimental metapopulations of altruists
and cheaters with diﬀerent levels of diversity, and measure the frequency of the
altruists. We predict that cheaters should dominate at low diversity levels, and
disappear when diversity increases. This result is similar to Jansen and van Baalen,
2006's study of beard chromodynamics, who found that altruism is facilitated when
many types coexist in the population.
Finally, in our study, we set arbitrarily the φ parameter. However, it is possible that
φ depends on bC , because it represents the increased capacity of dispersal. More
precisely, φ should be small if the propagules productions of altruists and cheaters are
close, and it should be higher when the cheaters rate of propagule production is very
diﬀerent from the altruists'. It would also be interesting to have a measurement of
its value. If we suppose that the number of propagules produced in a patch depends
on the density of bacteria, this would be simple: we would just need to determine
the density of cheaters when invading an empty patch, and compare it to the density
of cheaters when invading a patch of altruists.
5.5 Appendix
5.5.1 Linearisation of the complete system with mutations
We can determine the values of Ai and Ci at equilibrium, denoted A and C:

dAi
dt
= 0⇐⇒ C = A(bA − − nbAA−m)
A(bA + φbC)− δ
dCi
dt
= 0⇐⇒ A = C(bC −m− δ − nbCC)−+ C(−bA − φbC + nbA + nbC)
(5.30)
We then linearise and simplify the system. We note AiLin and CiLin the linearised
approximations of Ai and Ci respectively:
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dAiLin
dt
= −bAALinA− ACiLin(bA + φbC) + δ
(
(CLin − Ci)
n− 1 −
CAiLin
A
)
(5.31)
dCiLin
dt
= −bCCLinC + (bA + φbC)(AiLin − ALin)C + 
(
AiLin −
ACiLin
C
)
(5.32)
We could determine the Jacobian matrix from these linearised equations for any
number of types, but it becomes increasingly diﬃcult for high n. Alternatively, it
is possible to describe the system with new variables: the total density of altruists
and cheaters, denoted A and C, and the deviation from the mean, denoted A′ and
C ′
First we determine the dynamics of the total density of altruists:
dA
dt
=
(
−nbAA− δC
A
)
A+
(
δ − A(bA + φbC)
)
C (5.33)
Similarly we determine the dynamics of the total density of cheaters:
dC
dt
=
(
(bA + φbC)(1− n)C + 
)
A+
(
−nbCC − A
C
)
C (5.34)
The dynamics for the deviation from the mean for the altruists is
dA′
dt
=
d(
A
n
− Ai)
dt
= −δC
A
A′ +
(
−A(bA + φbC)− δ
n− 1
)
C ′ (5.35)
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The dynamics for the deviation from the mean for the cheaters is
dC ′
dt
=
d(
C
n
− Ci)
dt
=
(
C(bA + φbC) + 
)
A′ − A
C
C ′ (5.36)
The Jacobian matrix is thus
J =

−nbAA− δC
A
δ −A(bA + φbC) 0 0
(bA + φbC)(1− n)C +  −nbCC − A
C
0 0
0 0 −δC
A
−A(bA + φbC)− δ
n− 1
0 0 C(bA + φbC) +  −A
C

(5.37)
5.5.2 Determination of the sign of the determinant
We look at the value of Ci at equilibrium (equation 5.15), which rewrites as
C =
bA(bA + φbC − bAn)−m(bA + φbC − bCn)
(bA + φbC − bCn)(bA + φbC − bAn) (5.38)
The numerator corresponds to the condition of equation (5.17) and the denominator
is proportional to the determinant of equation (5.24). We next determine if C exists
when the determinant is negative. Let a new variable x = bA+φbC . Equation (5.38)
rewrites as
C =
bA
x− bCn −
m
x− bAn (5.39)
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The derivative of C with respect to x is
dC
dx
=
m
(x− bAn)2 −
bA
(x− bCn)2 (5.40)
Solving for 0 equation (5.40) gives 2 solutions, but only one with a negative denom-
inator for equation (5.38). The solution is
x0 = −
n
(√
bAm (bA − bC) + bCm− b2A
)
bA −m (5.41)
Which corresponds to a minimum for C. Hence the minimum value of C, called C0
is
C0 =
bA +m+ 2
√
bAm
(bA − bC)n (5.42)
C0 is an increasing function of bC , so the lowest value of C0 is obtained when bC = 0.
Equation (5.42) thus rewrites as
C0 =
1
n
+
m
bAn
+
2
√
bAm
bAn
>
1
n
(5.43)
The minimum value of C is superior to
1
n
, which is impossible because
1
n
is the
maximum frequency of one type at equilibrium. Thus C does not exist when the
determinant (Equation 5.24) is negative. Hence the determinant is always positive.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this thesis I investigated the eﬀect of diversity on the evolutionary dynamics in
systems where altruists compete with cheaters. In both gynodioecious plants and
siderophore producing bacteria, diversity arises through an incompatibility mechan-
ism, so that the public good is in fact a restricted good, that can be used only by
individuals capable of recognising it. Rather than being characterised only by the
strategy (cooperation or cheating), individuals are characterised by both a strategy
and a type. Diversity is generated through mutations changing the strategy and/or
the type of public good.
Rather than using classic models I have used biologically realistic examples and
explicit models of interactions between altruists and cheaters via the exploitation of
a public good. Previous studies (for instance Frank [1998], West and Buckling [2003],
Brown et al. [2009]) were using very strong ecological assumptions. In contrast, I
tried to stay as close as possible to the ecology of these organisms, which allowed me
to make important ﬁndings. In particular in Chapter 3, I derived both relatedness
and Hamilton's rule directly from ecological principles, instead of simply assuming
them. In Chapter 3 and 4 I modelled the local dynamics which were crucial to
understand the global dynamics.
I found that populations rarely stay monomorphic when mechanisms of incompatib-
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ility exist: diversity arises readily in most conditions. The level of diversity depends
on diﬀerent factors: in Chapter 2 I found that it depends on the spatial structure,
determining the balance of power between altruists and cheaters. If it's biased
towards altruists (with low dispersal rates) or cheaters (with high dispersal rates)
the diversity is low. Diversity is highest when altruists can be invaded but not over-
whelmed by cheaters, and similarly when new altruists invade without erasing all
the previous established diversity. In Chapter 4, I found that the level of diversity
depends on the mutation rates. In particular, high mutation rates lead to high levels
of diversity. In fact, the mutation rates also determine the balance of power between
altruists and cheaters: they control how fast a cheater can appear in a population
of altruists and how fast a new altruist appears in a population of cheaters.
I argue in this thesis that diversity results from non-equilibrium processes. When
there are no incompatibility mechanisms, the population dynamics are stable. But
when we include these mechanisms, the dynamics become unstable. In Chapter
2, the instability arises from the competition for space: cheaters invade rapidly
altruists, so altruists must constantly disperse away from the cheaters. In these
gynodioecious plants, the females cannot survive without the public good (pollen), so
they also have to follow the hermaphrodites in space. In Chapter 4, I found that the
instability arises from the associations of genetic drift and mutations. Indeed, genetic
drift leads to frequency ﬂuctuations of altruist populations. When a particular strain
of altruists become too numerous, a compatible cheater appears through mutations,
and regulate the frequency of the altruist. This mechanism maintains the diversity,
but the resulting dynamics are very unstable because populations are regulated
by a stochastic process. My results suggest that biodiversity is regulated by non-
equilibrium processes. They also suggest that to understand better how diversity
works, one must also look at the composition of the populations over time and not
only through simple snapshots.
The theoretical idea behind this thesis is the chromodynamics. As I have showed
in Chapter 2 and 4, this leads to a kind of Red Queen race, where no individuals
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or groups are constantly better overall and through time. The results of this race is
that it might lead to the appearance of organisms with high mutation rates. Indeed
in the chromodynamics the advantage occurs when novelty arises. High mutating
organisms should thus be favoured, and in fact have been discovered in the biological
systems I studied, but further investigations need to be led on other similar systems
to determine if this is a common feature.
In this thesis I extended the pioneering studies of chromodynamics to real biological
examples. I have used realistic models and related most results to the biology and
ecology of the studied species. This suggests that the chromodynamics might not
only be a theoretical toy but a real ecological mechanism that takes place in Nature.
The main insight I obtained is that I discovered a novel evolutionary mechanism
generating and maintaining diversity in Chapter 4, which could pave the way for
future theoretical and experimental studies in many systems.
To conclude I argue that the emergence of diversity should be quite common in this
type of system. This thesis provides a basis and framework for future studies on
the emergence and maintenance of diversity. In some related systems, such as the
FLO1 gene causing ﬂocculation in saccharomyces cerevisiae and the csA gene causing
adhesion in Dictyostelium discoideum, diversity has not been reported. Whether
this is because studies are not yet focused on diversity or because there exists a
mechanism preventing its emergence remains to be investigated.
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